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Abstract
In a modified dictator game experiment, we study how distributional justice,
measured by the proportionality between effort exerted and rewards obtained, and
guilt feelings triggered by others’ expectations affect dictator’s choices. We consider
these two sources of behavior in isolation and in interaction. Our results suggest
that both justice concerns and guilt aversion are important drivers of behavior.
However, the expectations of others are more relevant when the choice environment
is likely to induce less equitable outcomes.
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1 Introduction
In a well-known passage of his Second Treatise on Government, John Locke writes: “I
think, it is very easy to conceive, without any difficulty, how labour could at first begin
a title of property in the common things of nature [...]” (Chapter 5, Section 51). This
sentence captures the essence of what Locke labels a law of nature, i.e. that property
rights on goods originate directly from effort exerted to generate them. The Lockean law
of nature is grounded on a basic justice principle according to which outcomes should
be related to actions (desert). This general distributional principle has been subject to
extensive philosophical debate and has attracted the attention of experimental research,
both in social psychology (e.g. Leventhal and Michaels, 1969) and in economics (e.g.
Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Konow, 2000).
We aim at assessing the relevance of the “hard-wired” justice principle that relates
actions and consequences against an alternative measure of justice driven by emotions
originating in social interactions. Emotions have indeed been recognized to have a major
influence on economic behavior (Elster, 1998). In the last decade, the emotion of guilt has
received attention both from a theoretical and experimental perspective, due also to the
theory of guilt aversion (e.g. Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg,
2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Ellingsen et al., 2010).1 According to this theory,
decision-makers can experience a negative feeling, i.e. guilt, whenever they believe that
their action will contribute to let their counterpart down.
Relying on a within-subjects experimental design, we endeavor to understand if and
how justice concern a` la Locke and guilt aversion interact in shaping the behavior of
decision-makers. Our main objective is to test whether expectations of the counterpart
about the behavior of the decision-makers affect decision-makers’ behavior only when
these expectations are not in conflict with justice considerations. In other words, jus-
tice considerations may be key to understanding when others’ expectation are seen as
legitimate by the decision-maker and, thus, worth taking into account.
Our data show that outcome-based social preferences like altruism (e.g. Cox et al.,
2008), inequity-aversion (e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), or
1Although the focus of the present paper is on the theory of guilt aversion as formalized by Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), we are aware that the emotion of guilt
has received attention in other settings (e.g. Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006; Cervellati et al., 2010).
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efficiency (e.g. Charness and Rabin, 2002) play a modest role in explaining the behavior
of the subjects. Instead, guilt feelings and justice considerations are key in driving the
choices of decision-makers. However, quite unexpectedly, others’ expectations become
more relevant when the choice environment offers less protection to entitlement rights
originated by effort and, thus, it is less likely to produce equitable outcomes. In the con-
cluding section, we provide a possible explanation for this result which contradicts our
main research hypothesis. We also draw attention to how further research on the inter-
action between institutional protection of entitlement rights and subjective expectations
about standards of behavior is needed.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we present a literature review
of desert and of guilt aversion theories; Section 3 describes the experimental game and the
experimental procedures; Section 4 reports the research hypotheses; Section 5 illustrates
the experimental results; in Section 6, we discuss the results and provide final remarks.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Distributional Justice
Konow (2003) presents an extensive review of justice concepts that are relevant to eco-
nomics and provides the empirical basis to build a descriptive theory of justice. The
author highlights the relevance of theories that appeal to desert and relate fair allocations
to individual actions. Within this class of models, equity theory (e.g. Adams, 1963) pro-
vides guidance to assess the fairness of allocations in which a production stage is involved.
The basic tenet of the theory is that an equitable allocation should preserve the propor-
tionality of resources invested (input) and rewards obtained (output) across individuals.
Thus, those investing more resources in the production of the output should obtain more
out of it than those investing less. Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) point out how the propor-
tionality principle underlying equity theory captures the essence of the Lockean natural
law. Empirical support for the relevance of this justice principle is provided by exper-
imental studies in social psychology (e.g. Leventhal and Michaels, 1969; Mikula, 1974)
and economics (e.g. Konow, 2000). Relying on empirical evidence accumulated, Gill and
Stone (2010) provide a theoretical account of desert concerns in tournaments and shows
how concerns of this kind may substantially alter outcomes in strategic interactions.
To establish whether an allocation is fair, it is crucial to define the nature of the in-
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put against which the output is evaluated. According to attribution theory (e.g. Weiner,
1985), only factors that are directly controlled by individuals qualify to establish the
fairness of an allocation. This principle of justice is captured also by the accountability
principle of Konow (1996), which distinguishes between discretionary variables and ex-
ogenous variables. According to Konow, only the former should be taken into account
when assessing the fairness of allocations. The recent experimental work by Becker (2013)
shows that normative beliefs are strongly influenced by accountability considerations, but
individuals often violate the principle and selfishly enjoy rewards that originate from pure
luck. These results are also supported in the structural estimation presented by Cappelen
et al. (2007), when comparing alternative fairness ideals. The authors identify a plural-
ity of fairness ideals in the population, but also show that a non negligible share of the
population maintains a libertarian view according to which individuals deserve what they
produce, irrespective of the control exerted over the production factors.
2.2 Guilt Aversion
The idea of guilt aversion understood as the aversion to letting others down was first
introduced by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), who observe, both in a lost wallet game and
in a dictator game, a positive correlation between trustees’ (dictators’) transfers and their
second-order beliefs elicited after the play.2 In a later experiment, also Bacharach et al.
(2007) find evidence supporting this definition of guilt aversion in three modified trust
games. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) develop
a formal model of guilt aversion based on the analytical framework of the psychological
games (Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009).3
An important application of guilt aversion is provided by Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006), who exploit this theory to explain why individuals in experiments tend to keep
non-binding promises even when they would earn more by not doing so. Specifically,
Charness and Dufwenberg propose a modified trust game that allows for moral hazard by
trustees (so-called trust game with hidden action), where subjects can also exchange free
2The lost wallet game is a modified trust game which allows for several wealth multipliers, and where
the trustor only faces a dichotomous choice between trusting the trustee or not.
3Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) introduce a distinction between simple guilt and guilt from blame,
where the main difference between the two is in the fact that in the second form of guilt aversion, the
decision-maker dislikes being blamed, rather than simply letting the counterpart down.
4
form messages before the play. Charness and Dufwenberg first observe a positive corre-
lation between promises and trustworthiness. Moreover, consistently with guilt aversion,
they find that trustworthy choices are positively correlated with trustees’ second-order
beliefs elicited after the play. Thus, Charness and Dufwenberg conclude that promises
foster trustees’ second-order beliefs about trustors’ first-order belief on trustworthiness,
triggering a sense of guilt in those trustees who let trustors down.
Charness and Dufwenberg’s conclusions are questioned by Vanberg (2008), who tests
whether individuals keep their promises because they dislike letting others down, as pre-
dicted by guilt aversion, or rather because they have a taste for keeping their own word
(so-called “commitment-based explanation”), as modeled by Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2004) and Kartik (2009). Using a design that closely resembles that of Charness and
Dufwenberg’s, Vanberg finds support for the commitment-base explanation. In a trust
game with hidden-action, where subjects could only send bare promises, Charness and
Dufwenberg (2010) test whether “truth-value [is] all we need to capture an important
aspect of human motivation, or does the context in which the statement was made mat-
ter”. These authors find limited support both for a commitment-based explanation and
for guilt aversion.
Ellingsen et al. (2010) challenge Charness and Dufwenberg’s conclusions from another
perspective arguing that the positive correlation between trustees’ second-order beliefs and
their back-transfers is mainly due to the so-called “false consensus” effect (Engelmann and
Strobel, 2000, 2011), rather than to guilt aversion.4 According to this alternative expla-
nation, trustees may consider their own back-transfer choice as the most representative,
and hence believe that trustors’ first-order beliefs will coincide with their own. Thus,
the same trustees who prefer to make a large back-transfer could be those who believe
that trustors expect a large back-transfer. To test this hypothesis, instead of eliciting
second-order beliefs after the play, Ellingsen et al. reveal their partner’s first-order belief
to those subjects who were supposed to suffer from guilt. Ellingsen et al. do not detect
any evidence of guilt aversion in any of their experimental games, i.e. dictator game, lost-
wallet game, and trust game. Reuben et al. (2009), however, proposes a cleaner version
of the design by Ellingsen et al. and find that trustees are less trustworthy when trustors
4Vanberg also remarks that the correlation between second-order beliefs and actions could be driven
by the false consensus effects.
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have low expectations, concluding that mis-trust is self-fulfilling.5 Additional evidence in
support of guilt aversion in a different experimental setting, is offered by Ockenfels and
Werner (2014) who study how different scales with which beliefs are elicited before the
game can subsequently affect subjects’ behavior. Their findings also seem to suggest that,
in dictator games, dictators are motivated by not letting recipients’ down rather than by
conforming to a norm regarding dictators’ behavior. Bellemare et al. (2011) estimate
structural models of guilt from a large scale sequential game, where subjects are willing
to pay between forty to eighty cents to avoid letting their partner down by one euro.
Recently, Battigalli et al. (2013) proved how guilt aversion can offer an explanation
for the findings of the seminal experiment on deception by Gneezy (2005). Dufwenberg
et al. (2011) show how framing effect can influence contributions in a framed public goods
game through changes in subjects’ second-order beliefs. Finally, Babcock et al. (2014)
study the social effects of incentives in a series field experiments. One of the finding is
that subjects prefer individual incentives to team incentives, even if the latter are more
effective. Authors show that this result is consistent with the hypothesis that team effects
operate through guilt rather than pure altruism.
3 Experimental Design
The Modified Dictator Game. In our dictator game (Figure 1), a dictator is endowed
with two wallets. The dictator can either keep both wallets, or return one wallet to the
entitled recipient, who lost it. Both players have exerted an effort to earn their own wallet.
Thus, if the dictator keeps both wallets, the entitled recipient remains with no reward
for the effort done. If the dictator chooses to return the wallet, the entitled recipient will
restore it only with a certain “restoring probability”, which can take value 4/6, 5/6, or
6/6. Otherwise, the wallet is misplaced by Nature to an unentitled recipient (who exerted
no effort), with probability 2/6, 1/6, or 0/6, respectively.6 The restoring probability is
5Reuben et al. operate three major changes on the Ellingsen et al.’s design: (1) they provide all
subjects with the same instructions; (2) all subjects play both as trustor and trustee sequentially, and
beliefs are elicited when subjects play the role of senders, in a round when beliefs are unused; (3) they
increase the reward for the accuracy of beliefs and the game payoffs.
6The payoffs ensure that neither efficiency nor surplus distribution change under alternative restoring
probabilities. Choosing Keep is inefficient, since the payoff obtained by the dictator is lower than the
sum of two wallets, i.e. 12 ECU instead of 14 ECU.
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private information of the dictator, and the recipients do not observe the action of the
dictator. So, the entitled recipient cannot infer whether the dictator kept her wallet,
or Nature misplaced it.7 The restoring probability captures (exogenous) institutional
aspects, known only to the decision-maker, which ensure different degrees of protection
to the entitlement right of the entitled recipient.
Figure 1: Modified Dictator Game.
Dictator
Nature
piD = 9
piER = 0
piUR = 7
Misplaced
(1− PrRestore)
piD = 9
piER = 7
piUR = 0
Restored
(PrRestore)
Return
piD = 12
piER = 0
piUR = 0
Keep
Note: D: dictator; ER: entitled recipient; UR: unentitled recipient.
The Experimental Session. 15 subjects participates in each session, divided into two
groups, A (10 subjects) and B (5 subjects). Group A members actively participate in all
the three stages of the experiment (Figure 2); group B members actively participate only
in the second stage, i.e. beliefs elicitation. Group B members enter the laboratory after
Stage 1 and are allowed to surf the Internet during Stage 3.8
In Stage 1, each group A member earns her wallet, by counting the number of zeros in
seven 15×8 tables that sequentially appear on computer screens, and contain 0 and 1 digits
in random proportions.9 For each table solved, the subject earns 1 ECU (Experimental
7The presence of the Nature and the unobservability of the dictator’s action are common features to
the games of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Vanberg (2008).
8Interactions between group A and group B were avoided: group B had to show up 10 minutes later
than group A, and group A was allowed to leave the lab only after group B had left. To ease the
understanding of instructions, group A and B were identified as green and red, respectively. We provided
subjects with intuitive slides and checked comprehension using a quiz (Bigoni and Dragone, 2012).
9We borrow this task from Abeler et al. (2011) to induce a sense of entitlement on wealth in the
experiment. Previous works have shown the relevance of asset legitimacy in simple bargaining situations.
As an example, Hoffman et al. (1994) and Cherry et al. (2002) administered a knowledge questionnaire
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Figure 2: Timeline of the Experimental Session.
Currency Unit, 1 ECU=e1). Subjects are not time constrained, and can make mistakes.
At the end of Stage 1, each group A member virtually owns a wallet of 7 ECU.10
In Stage 2, all subjects are explained the modified dictator game, in order to collect
their expectations about the dictator’s behavior. Before the play, half of the group A
members randomly “lose” their wallet, and become entitled recipients. Lost wallets are
“found” by the other half of group A members, who become dictators. Group B mem-
bers are the unentitled recipient. The game is played repeatedly with a perfect stranger
matching for 3 rounds. Each dictator faces the three restoring probabilities in random
order (unknown to the recipients). No feedback is given to the players at the end of
each round. At the end of the session, one round is randomly drawn for the payment:
dictators are informed about the outcome of the payment round, while recipients only
learn the amount of ECU they obtained. Unlike Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), we do
not elicit second-order beliefs after the play. In this way, we avoid identification problems
due to false consensus effects (Engelmann and Strobel, 2000, 2011; Ellingsen et al., 2010).
Instead, we induce guilt feelings by providing dictators with the first-order belief of the
entitled recipient.11
Belief elicitation is key to our design. In Stage 2, before role assignment, we ask all
subjects to anticipate how many times out of the three, they expect a generic dictator to
return the wallet (Table 1). The reward for the belief accuracy depends on a randomly
to participants before taking part in an ultimatum and a dictator game respectively, and show that this
strongly reduces other-regarding concerns. We chose the Abeler et al. task because it provides a more
direct measure of effort exerted relative to a knowledge test in which human capital and luck seem to be
more important than effort.
10In the instructions, we do not use the word “wallet”, but we stress that each subject earns her own
endowment by performing the task.
11A similar solution to false consensus effect is used by Ellingsen et al. (2010) and Reuben et al. (2009),
with the former finding no correlation between decision-maker choices and counterparts’ expectations,
while the latter find evidence of guilt aversion.
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selected choice of a dictator: subjects know that the relevant dictator for the payment
of belief’s accuracy is not the same dictator whose choice is selected for the payment of
the dictator game.12 A quadratic scoring rule is used to incentivize subjects to truth-
fully report their belief. To avoid a methodologically questionable omission of relevant
information, we inform group A members that their beliefs may be disclosed to dicta-
tors. Knowing that with 50% probability their beliefs are reported to dictators, group A
members might strategically manipulate their beliefs.13 We control this issue ex-post, by
comparing the belief distributions of group A and group B, whose members know that
their belief are not disclosed to anyone.
Table 1: Elicitation of First–Order Beliefs
Dictator will choose Return. . .
0 out of 3 1 out of 3 2 out of 3 3 out of 3
Your guess. . . 2 2 2 2
Your earnings if
in the drawn choice. . .
Dictator chose Return e0 e2.80 e4.40 e5
Dictator chose Keep e5 e4.40 e2.80 e0
Procedures. The experiment was implemented at the Cognitive and Experimental Eco-
nomics Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento. 180 students took part in 12 ses-
sions. Subjects were recruited using dedicated software. The experiment was programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All subjects received a show-
up fee of e3.
4 Behavioral Predictions
Under standard assumptions of selfish rationality, dictators in our game should never
choose to return the wallet to an entitled recipient, irrespective of both the probability
with which the wallet gets misplaced and the entitled recipient’s expectation. However, a
large body of literature has highlighted how social preferences may play an important role
12This way, payoffs consequences of a dictator’s choice do not extend to the belief elicitation. To inhibit
recipients’ belief updates, we do not provide any feedback during the three rounds of play.
13Roles in the game are not yet assigned when beliefs are elicited. This should discourage potential
strategic manipulation of reported beliefs by prospective group A members.
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in determining the behavior of individuals participating in experiments. In our context,
outcome-based social preferences like altruism (e.g. Cox et al., 2008), inequity-aversion
(e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), or efficiency (e.g. Charness
and Rabin, 2002) may induce the dictator to return the wallet. Thus, unlike under
assumptions of selfish rationality, a large class of social preferences predicts that dictators
may choose to return the wallet. However, like under selfish rationality, outcome-based
social preferences predict that dictators decisions should be neither affected by different
restoring probabilities nor by the expectations of the entitled recipient.
While selfishness and outcome-based social preferences provide us with useful bench-
mark behavioral predictions, the main focus of our inquiry is on how justice concerns
linked to the protection of entitlement rights (proxied by restoring probabilities) and
counterparts’ expectations (measured by recipients’ first-order beliefs) affect dictators’
decisions. Accordingly, we present some testable hypotheses which refer to the impact of
these potential sources of behavior.
When a dictator “finds” the wallet lost by an entitled recipient, a strongly unfair
and inequitable allocation is exogenously induced because both subjects have exerted the
same effort, but (almost) all the surplus generated is given to the dictator. Dictators can
restore justice by returning the wallet for which the entitled recipient worked. However,
when the returned wallet is misplaced because of an interference of Nature, an even less
equitable allocation is in place as the wallet is given to someone who did not exert any
effort at all. This is due to the fact that the welfare loss when one receives more than
what deserved is likely to be smaller than the welfare loss when another party receives
more than what deserved.14 Therefore, alternative restoring probabilities impact on the
anticipated proportionality between efforts exerted to “generate” the wallet and rewards
obtained when the wallet is returned.
To illustrate our behavioral predictions, we consider a simple model in which the
utility of the dictator i is given by Ui = pii + θφ(αj, λ, pij), where pii and pij are the
14According to Gill and Stone (2010), when one gets more than what deserved, she can either ex-
perience a welfare gain (desert elation) or a welfare loss (desert guilt). However, when the other gets
more than what deserved, a loss of welfare is unambiguously experienced (desert loss). Moreover, the
change in welfare experienced when receiving less than what deserved is assumed to be larger than the
change in welfare when receiving more, consistently with the loss aversion assumption of Prospect Theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
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monetary payoffs of i and j, αj captures j’s beliefs about wallet return, and λ is the
restoring probability faced by the dictator. The function φ(·) captures welfare gains from
returning the wallet, with θ > 0 measuring how much this is valued relative to increases in
own monetary payoff. We allow φ(·) to change according to motivations of dictators and
identify three main sources of motivation: pure justice concerns, pure guilt aversion, and
reasonable guilt aversion. In the following, we discuss qualitative predictions obtained for
distinct motives.15
4.1 Pure Justice Concerns
According to equity theory (Adams, 1963) and to the accountability principle (Konow,
2000, 2003), individuals investing more resources in the production of a certain surplus
should receive a larger share of it than those investing less. In our context, justice concerns
based on input/output proportionality translate into a higher likelihood of returning the
wallet when the chances of a misplaced return are lower.
In terms of the utility function presented above, we capture pure justice concerns by
assuming that φ(·) = λpij , so that Ui = pii + θλpij. Under this representation of Ui, we
have that the utility of returning the wallet is increasing in λ. Accordingly, we predict
that
Hypothesis 1. the higher the restoring probability (i.e. the lower the likelihood of a
misplaced return), the more likely dictators are to choose to return the wallet.
4.2 Pure Guilt Aversion
According to the theory of guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and
Dufwenberg, 2007), an individual will be disappointed when the final outcome of the game
does not match expectations. Thus, decision-makers who can influence the outcome of
the game may experience a negative emotion of guilt whenever their action contributes
to letting their counterpart down. A guilt sensitive decision-maker may hence prefer to
renounce part of her material payoff to avoid the psychological cost of guilt. Given that
in our experiment recipients are kept blind about the restoring probability faced by the
15For the sake of exposition, we neglect here that the three motivations are simultaneously at work.
However, the analysis of experimental outcomes reported below allows for this possibility.
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dictator, more optimistic recipients will always be more disappointed by realizing that
they did not receive their wallet back. The feeling of guilt experienced when retaining
the wallet should hence be stronger when facing an optimistic recipient than when facing
a less optimistic one, irrespective of the restoring probability.
More formally, we capture pure guilt aversion by assuming that φ(·) = αjpii, which
implies that Ui = pii + θαjpii. The utility of returning the wallet is higher for higher
values of αj. Since in our context dictators freely access the expectations of the entitled
recipient16, we predict that
Hypothesis 2. the more optimistic the recipients’ expectations about the return of the
wallet, the more likely dictators are to return it..
4.3 Reasonable Guilt Aversion
Predictions based on pure justice considerations and pure guilt aversion provide us with a
guidance to evaluate the impact of equity considerations and of recipient’s expectation in
isolation. However, these two sources of behavior are likely to interact in shaping dictator’s
behavior. Even though guilt aversion predicts dictators to suffer the same amount of guilt
irrespective to the restoring probability, we expect dictators to attach a different weight
to the same expectation when facing different restoring probabilities. The intuition here
is that the impact of counterpart’s expectation on dictator’s choices is conditional upon
environmental features, which may remain unknown to the former but not to the latter.
We rely on the assumption that beliefs of j, reflect justice considerations. This implies
that if αj = 1/3 (seldom), j expects i to return the wallet only when λ = 6/6. By the
same token, when αj = 2/3 (often), j expects the dictator i to return the wallet when
λ = 6/6 and λ = 5/6, and when αj = 3/3 (always), j expects the dictator i to return the
wallet when λ = 6/6, λ = 5/6, and λ = 4/6.
When a dictator i learns αj, he will check the consistency between the restoring
probability λ in that specific round and the belief αj. A belief is reasonable only if it
16Similar to Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), we implicitly assume that “players do not coordinate on
some “equilibrium”; it refers only to the individual player and properties of his/her utility.” In particular,
we assume that recipients do not perfectly anticipate the degree of guilt sensitivity of the dictators they
meet across the three rounds. This assumption seems reasonable since guilt sensitivity can differ across
individuals (Tangney, 1995). Moreover, we never provide recipients with feedback about dictators’ choices
in order to avoid any belief update.
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reflects the actual restoring probability. Accordingly, the set R of reasonable beliefs is
given by the following ordered pairs (λ, αj):
R = {(6/6, 1/3), (6/6, 2/3), (6/6, 3/3), (5/6, 2/3), (5/6, 3/3), (4/6, 3/3)}.
In terms of the utility function presented above, we assume that φ(·) = IRαjpij, where IR
is equal to 1 if αj ∈ R, and equal to 0 otherwise. Thus, we predict that
Hypothesis 3. conditional upon beliefs being reasonable, the more optimistic the recip-
ients’ expectations about the return of the wallet, the more likely dictators are to return
it.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 3 shows the separate distribution of the first-order beliefs about dictators’ return
choices for the A and B groups.17 When self-reporting their beliefs, individuals in the A
group are aware that this piece of information could be potentially disclosed to dictators.
On the other hand, individuals in the B group know that their beliefs are not reported
to dictators. Thus, the comparison between the self-reported beliefs of the two groups
provides us with a control of the potential strategic manipulation of beliefs by prospective
recipients. We adopt the labels “Never”, “Seldom”, “Often”, and “Always” to identify
beliefs that range from 0 returns out of 3 choices made, to 3 returns out of 3 choices made.
17When beliefs are elicited, members of group A do not already know to which role they will be assigned
in the modified dictator game.
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Figure 3: First-Order Beliefs about Dictator’s Return
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In both group A and B, a large majority of the participants (about 80%) expects a
generic dictator to return the wallet less than 2 times out of the 3 total choices, with the
mode of the distribution corresponding to the “Seldom” return frequency (1 out of 3).
Although members of group A are slightly more pessimistic than group B members (0.32
vs. 0.37 respectively), when comparing the distributions of beliefs in the two groups, no
statistically significant difference is observed (Fisher’s Exact Test, p-value=0.117). Thus,
we can safely conclude that those in the A group do not strategically manipulate their
beliefs in a significant way.
Earnings in the belief task provide us with a direct measure of belief accuracy. Median
earnings in the task are equal to e4.40 both for the red and the green group, just one step
away from the maximum earnings of e5. Thus, self-reported beliefs seem to be overall
quite accurate.
Figure 4 displays the relative frequency of individual-level return choices.
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Figure 4: Return Choices per Dictator
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As shown above, 47.0% of the dictators choose to never return. Among those choosing
to return, the majority chooses to return the wallet only once and only 2 dictators out
of 60 choose to always return the wallet. Overall, half of the dictators choose differently
across the three rounds.
Figure 4 clearly shows that about half of collect choices are compatible with selfishness.
Concerning the conspicuous share of non-selfish dictators, very few choices are compatible
with standard outcome-based social preferences. As pointed out in Section 4, non-selfish
individuals concerned only with the payoff consequences of their actions are likely to
always return the wallet, irrespective of the restoring probability and of beliefs of the
counterpart. The behavior of non-selfish dictators seems to be largely conditional upon
the contextual elements in which the choice is made for different probabilities of success,
with more dictators returning for the highest probability (30.0%) than for the other two
probabilities of success (21.7%). Table 2 reports the percentage returns observed for
alternative levels of restore probability and of counterpart’s beliefs, both when considered
alone and when jointly taken. As an example, the first cell in the table shows that out of
the 19 dictators who jointly faced a probability of success of 4/6 and a recipient’s belief
of zero returns in a round, only 1 of them decided to return the wallet (i.e. 5.3%).
As shown by the last column in Table 2 (Overall), in correspondence to the highest
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Table 2: Return Choices conditional upon Recipient’s Beliefs and Restoring Probabilities
Recipient’s First-Order Belief
PrRestore Never (N=19) Seldom (N=27) Often (N=13) Always (N=1) Overall
4/6 5.3% 25.9% 38.5% 0.0% 21.7%
5/6 15.8% 25.9% 23.1% 0.0% 21.7%
6/6 31.6% 37.0% 15.4% 0.0% 30.0%
Overall 17.5% 29.6% 25.6% 0.0% 24.4%
probability of restore we can observe the highest percentage in returns, which is in line
with Hypothesis 1. However, the percentage of returns in the intermediate probability
of restore and in the lowest do not differ. The bottom row in Table 2 provides evidence
about the impact of a counterpart’s beliefs and shows that the lower percentage of returns
is observed in correspondence to the lowest level of beliefs, in line with Hypothesis 2, but
the maximum share of returns is observed in correspondence to “Seldom” rather than to
“Often”.18
When taking into account the joint effect of beliefs and restore probabilities, the fre-
quency of returns monotonically increases in the beliefs of the counterpart, in correspon-
dence to PrRestore = 4/6. A Fisher’s exact test (FET) shows that there is a statistically
significant difference between return choices in correspondence to the “Never” and “Of-
ten” belief levels (p-value= 0.029). Moreover, the return rates observed in correspondence
to these two belief levels are the overall lowest and highest respectively. In contrast, for
PrRestore = 5/6 and PrRestore = 6/6 the impact of beliefs of the counterpart seems to
be more erratic, with no significant differences in return choices in correspondence to the
“Never” and “Often” belief levels (FET, p-values≥ 0.420).19
The descriptive analysis reported above suggests that both restore probabilities and
beliefs of the counterpart have a positive impact on return decisions even though the
impact of these variable is not fully in line with Hypothesis 1 and 2. Moreover, beliefs
and probabilities seem to interact in shaping dictator choices in a way that is in contrast
to our Hypothesis 3. Below we report a regression analysis that provides us with a further
18The belief level “Always” is neglected in the discussion because only one observation is available.
19For any PrRestore, the comparisons of “Never” and “Seldom” and of “Seldom” and “Often” do not
reveal any significant difference (all p-values≥ 0.115)
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test of our three main hypotheses and which casts further light on the behavior in the
experiment.
5.2 Regression Analysis
Table 3 reports the outcomes of a series of Generalized Linear Mixed Logit (GLM Logit)
models controlling for repeated choices at the individual level through random effects.
The dependent variable in all regressions is the dictator’s decision to return the wallet
(Return), assuming value 1 when the dictator returns and 0 otherwise.
Four distinct estimates are presented in Table 3. In Model 1, we only consider first-
order beliefs of the recipient (RecBel) as the main explanatory variable, with RecBel as-
suming values {0
3
, 1
3
, 2
3
, 3
3
} for beliefs equal to “Never”, “Seldom”, “Often”, and “Always”,
respectively. In Model 2, we also control for the alternative probabilities with which the
entitled recipient restores her wallet once the dictator chose to return it (PrRestore), i.e.
4
6
, 5
6
, or 6
6
. In Model 3, we also include the interaction between recipients’ beliefs and a
dummy variable capturing the “reasonableness” of beliefs, according to the definition given
above (see Hypothesis 3).20 Model 4 introduces, as an explanatory variable, the dicta-
tor’s first-order belief about the behavior of other dictators (DictBel) and how these belief
stand relative to the belief of the recipient, with a specific focus on the case in which beliefs
of the recipient are more optimistic than those of the dictator (RecBel > DictBel).21
Finally, for each estimate we considered a set of control variables regarding gender
(Male), employment status (Worker), citizenship (Italian), and previous participation
in experiments (Experienced).
20Beliefs are deemed reasonable if they reflect the actual probability of restoring faced by the dictator,
under the assumption that more optimistic beliefs are associated to higher restoring probabilities. Specif-
ically, the dummy variable Reason is equal to 1: when PrRestore = 66 and RecBel =
1
3 or RecBel =
2
3
or RecBel = 33 ; when PrRestore =
5
6 and RecBel =
2
3 or RecBel =
3
3 ; when PrRestore =
4
6 and
RecBel = 33 . Otherwise, the dummy Reason is equal to 0.
21The beliefs of the dictator are collected before knowing the actual role in the game. Thus, DictBel
and RecBel refer to the same set of beliefs.
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Table 3: Determinants of return choices.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) −0.750 (0.730) −2.040 (1.377) −5.138 (1.983)∗∗ −5.595 (2.021)∗∗
RecBel 0.695 (0.756) 0.718 (0.766) 3.254 (1.325)∗ 4.254 (1.456)∗∗
PrRestore 1.531 (1.366) 4.936 (2.054)∗ 4.675 (2.080)∗
RecBel×Reason −3.450 (1.414)∗ −3.283 (1.453)∗
DictBel 2.983 (0.985)∗∗
RecBel > DictBel −1.217 (0.725)◦
Male −0.289 (0.420) −0.290 (0.425) −0.526 (0.440) −0.521 (0.410)
Worker −0.019 (0.225) −0.019 (0.228) −0.010 (0.231) −0.064 (0.222)
Italian −0.865 (0.602) −0.877 (0.613) −0.915 (0.615) −0.750 (0.543)
Experienced 0.248 (0.505) 0.247 (0.512) 0.414 (0.518) −0.245 (0.516)
AIC 209.519 210.241 205.661 184.078
BIC 231.870 235.784 234.398 219.200
Num. obs. 180 180 180 180
Num. groups: ID 60 60 60 60
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All estimates are from GLM Logit models
including random effects at subject-level. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05,
◦p < 0.1.
The information criteria reported in the lower panel of Table 3 (AIC and BIC) unani-
mously suggest that Model 4 best exploits the information available and, thus, we focus on
this specification when commenting on our results. However, as shown by the comparison
of Models 3 and 4, the main results are robust across alternative specifications.22
Model 4 shows that a higher probability of restoring the wallet to the entitled recipient
induces more returns on the side of dictators, providing support to the hypothesis of justice
concern (Hypothesis 1). In other words, when the probability of a misplaced return is
lower, dictators are more likely to choose to return.
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of RecBel suggests that more opti-
mistic beliefs of the recipient are more likely to trigger a return than less optimistic ones.
This provides support to the hypothesis of guilt aversion (Hypothesis 2).
The estimated coefficient of the interaction RecBel × Reason is negative and statis-
tically significant. Thus, in contrast to our Hypothesis 3, facing recipients that maintain
reasonable beliefs discourages returns. This surprising result seems to be largely due to
the frequent return choices observed when restoring probabilities are low, as highlighted
22Results are robust to specifications where controls and/or random effects are omitted.
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also by Table 2.
Finally, controls on dictator’s first-order beliefs suggest that expectations about be-
havior of others in the same role are positively correlated to dictators’ choices (DictBel).
Furthermore, when the beliefs of the recipient are too optimistic relative to those of the
dictator (RecBel > DictBel), returns are less likely.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
Results from our experiment demonstrate that justice concerns, originating in the balance
between effort and rewards, play an important role in shaping dictators’ choices in our
modified dictator game. When there is a higher probability that the endowment is re-
turned to the individual who did not work to generate it, fewer dictators decide to return.
This result hence adds to previous works highlighting the relevance of the proportionality
between inputs and outputs in a production process (e.g. Adams, 1963; Konow, 2000).
Our experiment also shows that dictators react to the expectations of their counter-
part, by being more likely to return when facing optimistic recipients. As a result of our
chosen experimental design, it is possible to causally interpret the effect that recipients’
beliefs have on dictators choices. After ruling out confounds as the false consensus effect
and verifying the absence of strategic manipulation of expectations, we can safely inter-
pret this finding as an attempt of dictators to avoid the negative emotion of guilt. While
evidence on guilt aversion is still mixed, our findings are partially consistent with those
experiments providing empirical support to this theory.
Our results clearly show that both justice concerns and counterpart’s expectations
affect dictators. We further contribute to the literature by showing how these two rele-
vant sources of behavior interact. The intuition driving our research hypothesis is that
counterpart’s expectations are more likely to affect behavior when they reflect justice con-
siderations. To our surprise, however, the expectations of the entitled recipients are more
likely to be fulfilled when the likelihood of a misplaced return is higher. In other words,
a lower protection of entitlement rights crowds-in the role of others’ expectations. We
believe that this result may deserve further attention as it provides interesting insights
into the working of institutions, which are proxied by different restoring probabilities in
our experiment. Data collected suggest that when institutions are weaker, i.e. they offer
less protection to legitimate property rights, individuals may rely more on a subjective
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measures of justice, as captured by the expectations of the counterpart which trigger a
sense of guilt when disappointed.
Finally, we observe that, together with beliefs of the counterpart, the beliefs of the
decision-maker also play a crucial role in explaining behavior. We hence attempt to
rationalize the evidence from Model 4 in Table 3 in the light of the theoretical framework
proposed by Bicchieri (2006), according to which individuals are more inclined to comply
to a norm when, (1) they expect others to follow it, and (2) they are expected by others
to follow it, conditional upon others’ expectations to be legitimate. In line with the
first part of Bicchieri’s argument, we find a strong positive correlation between dictators’
beliefs about a generic dictator choosing to return the wallet and their own decision to
return. At the same time, we see that dictators facing over-optimistic beliefs (with respect
to their own) tend to react in the opposite way, suggesting that for others’ expectations
to be effective these must appear appropriate.
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Appendices
A Instructions
[ONLY THE FIRST 10 SUBJECTS ARE IN THE LAB]
Welcome!
For showing up you have earned e3. During the session you can earn more money. The
entire amount will be paid to you in private at the end of this session. Please, follow the
instructions carefully and do not speak to the other participants. If you have questions,
raise your hand and one of the experimenters will answer to you in private.
The session consists of 4 stages. You are identified as the Green Group and you are
going to complete the first stage. After the first stage, another group of participants will
enter this room,and will be identified as the Red Group.
Stage 1 – Work. In this stage you have to count the number of zeros within seven
tables that will consecutively appear on your screen. For each table you will earn 1 token
once you have inputed the correct number of zeros.
In a following stage, something unexpected could occur which implies the loss of the
tokens you have earned. At the end of the session, each token you own will be converted
into e1.
The Red Group can now come in.
[RED GROUP ENTERS THE LAB]
Welcome!
For showing up you have earned e3. During the session you can earn more money.
Please, follow the instructions carefully and do not speak to the other participants.
The 10 participants who were already in this room are identified as the Green Group.
The 5 participants that have just entered are instead identified as the Red Group.
The members of the Green Group have already been here for about 15 minutes, and
have just completed Stage 1 of the session, which consisted of counting the number of
zeros in a sequence of tables. For doing the work, every member of the Green Group has
earned 7 tokens. At the end of the session, each token you own will be converted into e1.
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The members of the Red Group will participate only in the next stage of the session,
and then they will be allowed to freely surf on the Internet, but the members of the Green
Group will have to participate actively in the whole session. Before being allowed to leave,
they will have to wait until all the members of the Red Group are paid.
To understand the Stage 2 (estimation) you need to know about Stage 3 (unexpected)
and Stage 4 (decision). Before proceeding to Stage 2, we will give you the instructions
for stage 3 and 4. Everyone, please carefully follow the instructions.
Stage 3 – Unexpected. In this stage none of the participants are asked to take any
decisions. The computer will execute all the procedures automatically.
If you are a member of the Green Group, you could suffer an unexpected : one person
every two, randomly selected by the computer, will lose the 7 tokens earned from the
work in Stage 1 and will become Participant B (see the picture). The lost earnings of
Participant B will be given to another person, Participant A, randomly selected from
among the 5 members of the Green Group who did not suffer the unexpected (see the
picture).
If you are a Green Group member, on your screen you will see the role that was
assigned to you. If you are a Red Group member, you will be allowed to surf the Internet.
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Stage 4 – Decision. Every Participant A is paired with the Participant B from whom
he/she has received the gain. Each Participant A will have to decide whether to return
the gain to Participant B:
• If he/she decides to not return, A earns a total of 12 tokens and B remains with 0
tokens.
• If he/she decides to return, A earns a total of 9 tokens and B restores his/her initial
earning of 7 coins with a probability between 67% and 100%. In the cases where B
does not restore his/her earnings, the 7 tokens are transferred to a member of the
Red Group, selected at random. The outcome of the restitution is determined with
a die roll (performed by the computer).
Participants’ total earnings are summarized in the following diagram:
The situation just described will be repeated three times. In each repetition, each
Participant B will be paired again with a new Participant A, different from the one
previously met (i.e. you will never be paired with the same person for more than one
repetition). Are there any questions about this?
There are still three important things to say about Stage 4:
1. In each of the three repetitions, the restoring probability is different and randomly
changes between 67% and 100% in the following ways:
Important: Only Participant A knows the exact probability with which the 7
tokens will be restored by B. Participant B will never know, because the order with
which the different restoring probabilities appear is random and remains unknown
to B.
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2. All the decisions will be taken sequentially, without receiving feedback on their
outcome. At the end of Stage 4, every participants will see the number of tokens
earned. Only Participant A will be informed about the outcome of his/her choice
in the repetition randomly selected for the payment (see below).
3. One of the three repetitions, selected at random by the computer, will be paid at
the end of the session.
Before proceeding, we will ask you to answer some control questions about the instructions.
We can now return to Stage 2.
Stage 2 – Estimation. You are now asked to report what decisions you expect from
Participants A in Stage 4 (decision). In particular, you have to estimate how many times
you expect a generic Participant A will choose to return the gain to the Participant B
across the three repetitions (from 0 out of 3, to 3 out of 3). Is that clear?
The more your estimate is accurate, the more money you can earn. To evalauate the
accuracy of your estimate, the computer will match you to a Participant A selected at
random. The Participant A randomly selected to determine your earning for the Stage
2 (estimate) will be different from the Participant A who will be selected at random to
determine your earning in the stage 4 (decision). At the end of the session, the computer
will draw at random one of the three decisions made by Participant A you are matched
to. The computer will compare your estimate with the choice of A in the drawn decision
(the choice could be either “Return” or “Not return”).
In the table you can see how much you will earn given your estimate and the choice
of Participant A.
Dictator will choose Return. . .
0 out of 3 1 out of 3 2 out of 3 3 out of 3
Your guess. . . 2 2 2 2
Your earnings if
in the drawn choice. . .
Dictator chose Return 0 e 2.80 e 4.40 e 5 e
Dictator chose Keep 5 e 4.40 e 2.80 e 0 e
Note: During Stage 4, before each decision, Partecipants A will be also informed
about the estimate made in Stage 2 by Participant B with whom they are paired.
Payment: The total amout paid at the end of the session (in addition to the e3 for
showing up) is the sum of the gain for the accuracy of your estimate in Stage 2, and your
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earnings in the repetition randomly selected from Stage 4.
From here on, Red Group members can surf the Internet.
B Slides and Quiz
All the slides used in the experiment are based on picture depicted in the experimental
instructions. Subjects observed all the possible outcomes of the game.
Translation of the quiz:
1. During Stage 3, how are roles assigned to Green Group members?
• At random
• Those who have not worked well suffer the unexpected and become Partici-
pants B
• Those who have not worked well suffer the unexpected and become Partici-
pants A
2. During Stage 4, every Red Group member. . .
• chooses whether or not to return the gain lost by Participant A
• leaves the room
• waits for all Participants A to complete their choices, surfing the Internet
3. During Stage 4, every Participant B. . .
• chooses whether or not to return the gain lost by Participant A
• waits for all Participants A to complete their choices
• waits for all Participants A to complete their choices, surfing the Internet
4. During Stage 4, every Participant A. . .
• chooses whether or not to return the gain lost by Participant B
• waits for all Participants A to complete their choices
• waits for all Participants A to complete their choices, surfing the Internet
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5. During Stage 4, what happens when a Participant A chooses to return the gain to
Participant B?
• The gain is always restored by Participant B (the original owner)
• A die is rolled to establish whether the gain actually is restored to B. The
restoring probability is always different
• A die is rolled to establish whether the gain actually is restored to B. The
restoring probability is always the same
6. During Stage 4, what happens when a Participant A chooses to return the gain to
Participant B but the roll of the die determines that the gain is not restored?
• The gain is not returned to anybody and thus it is lost
• The gain remains to Participant A
• The gain is transfered to a member of the Red Group chosen at random
7. During Stage 4, what happens when Participant A chooses to return the earnings
to Participant B, but the roll of the die determines that the earning is not restored?
• The earning is not returned to anybody and thus it is lost
• The earning remains to Participant A
• The earning is transfered to a member of the Red Group chosen at random
8. In each repetition, the restoring probability. . .
• is known to all participants
• is known only to Participant B
• is known only to Participant A
9. When is the die rolled?
• Whenever Participant A chooses to not return
• Whenever Participant A chooses to return
• Always, irrespective to the choice of A
10. Participant A. . .
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• cannot change her decision (“Return” / “Not Return”) across the 3 repetitions
• can change her decision (“Return” / “Not Return”) across the 3 repetitions
• cannot change her decision (“Return” / “Not Return”) in only one repetition
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Abstract
A key driver of the opposition to public projects which can be perceived as
noxious (e.g. landfills, power plants, or incinerators) is the mistrust of local com-
munities towards the proposer of the project. In a novel laboratory experiment, I
study how to promote a fruitful participation of communities in the realization of
public projects, by testing the effectiveness of two tools available to policy–makers:
information disclosure about the project, and compensatory side-transfers. Both
tools display critical aspects. Endogenous information disclosure is threatened by
the existence of an equilibrium in which actors do not exert the cooperative effort
necessary to make information available. Monetary side-transfers might crowd-out
the intrinsic motivation of the community members, which would lead them to host
a socially desirable project. I find that both tools significantly increase the num-
ber carried out projects, creating positive social surplus. However, the tools have
different impacts on the types of projects which are realized.
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1 Introduction
The opposition to public projects that might be socially desirable is widespread problem
in the field. Typical examples of contested projects are power plants, landfills, airports,
incinerators, and clinics for mental health problems. Previous economic studies have
focused on the specific case in which the contested project always imposes a cost on the
community living in a perspective host site, while it is always beneficial to the other
actors, i.e. the non-host communities and the proposer of the project (e.g. Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002; Feinerman et al., 2004; Sakai,
2012). This type of projects is indeed defined as “Not In My Backyard” or NIMBY,
because everyone would want the project to be realized in a community other than his or
her own.1
While the NIMBY problem is a relevant source of opposition to public projects, several
case studies suggest that the opposition is frequently triggered by a lack of trust of local
communities in the proposer of the project (e.g. Petts, 1995; Baxter et al., 1999). Often,
proposers argue that their project is safe and that costs and benefits are balanced among
the actors. Instead, host communities tend to be skeptical about it. In some cases,
communities question the social desirability of the project, in other cases they oppose to
it because they believe they will bare its entire cost, just as in the NIMBY case. When
the host community members are uncertain about the type of the project, they may
even oppose to projects from which they would benefit, for instance because a careful
redistribution of the surplus generated by the project was designed, or because the project
would have a positive return in terms of working places.
In an environment characterized by asymmetric information about the project’s type,
there are at least five major issues: (1) the proposer’s choice of the project’s type; (2) the
selection of the host site; (3) the social surplus generated by the project; (4) information
disclosure about the project’s type; (5) compensatory side-transfers to the individuals
living in the host site. Since the purpose of this study is to provide insights on which
tools could mitigate oppositions, I will focus on issues (4) and (5), leaving the remaining
for future research. In this regard, I developed a novel experimental game that captures
the problem of mistrust between the community and the proposer of the project. In the
game, a proposer endowed with different types of project can either try to carry it out, or
1Frey et al. (1996) define NIMBY projects as “all undertakings that increase overall welfare but impose
net costs on the individuals living in the host community”.
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renounce to it. All types of project generate the same positive social surplus, but differ
in how costs and benefits are allocated among the actors. The type of the project is
private information of the proposer. In the baseline, if a proposer chooses to carry out
the project, a randomly selected host site will decide whether or not to accept to realize
the unknown project.
When the project’s type is uncertain, the process of information disclosure and as-
similation is crucial to its realization. I investigate this aspect in a first treatment, by
allowing actors to disclose information about the project’s type through a costly joint
effort. This treatment relies on the model of communication with moral hazard in teams
of Dewatripont and Tirole (2005). Since the game has two equilibria, one in which no
effort is exerted and another in which all actors exert their effort, the experiment answers
to the empirical question of which equilibrium will be actually played. I find that subjects
generally coordinate on the Pareto superior equilibrium, where the information disclosure
tool is exploited. Thus, the tool is effective in increasing the number of projects realized.
In a second treatment, I test another tool available for policy-makers, namely monetary
side-transfers to compensate the host. Standard economic theory predicts that these
side-transfers should mitigate the opposition of the host community, as long as they are
fully compensatory. However, the evidence from non-incentivized surveys suggests that
side-transfers can increase the opposition (e.g. Kunreuther and Easterling, 1990; Frey
et al., 1996). In particular, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) show that in perspective
host communities where the civic sense prevails, monetary side-transfers crowd out the
intrinsic motivation of the inhabitants, which would lead them to bear a cost for the com-
mon good. In the experiment (which shares similar aspects with the mentioned surveys),
I find that side-transfers have a positive effect on the likelihood of realizing a project.
The data are consistent with the idea that when the civic sense is low and the intrinsic
motivation is weak, side-transfers can still be effective (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997).
Indeed, the neutral framing used in the experiment may induce subjects to reason in terms
of payoffs rather than in terms of behaving in a civic way. In addition, the experiment
reveals that subjects tend to endorse the realization of noxious projects even when they
are only partially compensated for hosing it. I show that this result can be rationalized
with preferences for social-welfare a` la Charness and Rabin (2002). This behavioral trait
has been previously overlooked by the literature on public projects and side-transfers.
While both the tools studied in this paper significantly enhance the projects’ realiza-
tion, side-transfers and information disclosure have different implications for the type of
projects that are implemented. In the treatment with endogenous information disclosure,
almost only balanced projects go through. Instead, in the treatment with side-transfers,
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the number of noxious projects that goes through is much higher. In the latter treatment,
if sufficiently compensated, hosts agree to implement projects knowing that these will
damage the non-host.
This experiment aims at providing complementary evidence to the few empirical stud-
ies existing in the literature on contested public projects. The experimental technique
allows to overcome some identification challenges that characterize empirical studies. For
instance, it may be difficult to precisely assess the payoffs of the actors involved in a field
interaction. Another challenge is the endogeneity of the choice of the host sites. Moreover,
most of the empirical studies rely on surveys carried out in perspective host-sites, and
respondents might have an incentive to answer strategically (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee,
1997). Finally, with a focus on side-transfers, experiments can offer a valuable tool to
detect any hypothetical bias in the self-reported answers (Harrison, 2006).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a short literature review; Section 3
describes the experimental games and the experimental procedures; Sections 4 provides
the theoretical analysis; Section 5 presents the results; and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Different from this paper, previous studies have investigated the issue of the opposition
to public projects by assuming NIMBY projects.2 Therefore, in this section, I review the
literature on the NIMBY phenomenon in economics.
A long standing body of literature takes a normative stance, proposing mechanisms
which allow to identify an optimal host site (i.e. a site characterized by the lowest cost to
become host of the project) and induce it to accept the project through side-transfers. A
seminal contribution in this perspective is the one of Kunreuther and Kleindorfer (1986).
Other important theoretical contributions to this literature are the mechanisms of Perez-
Castrillo and Wettstein (2002), Minehart and Neeman (2002), and Laurent-Lucchetti and
Leroux (2011). Recently, Sakai (2012) provided an axiomatic analysis of the NIMBY
problem, characterizing a fair pricing rule. Some of these mechanisms have also been
tested with lab experiments (Kunreuther et al., 1987; Pe´rez-Castrillo and Veszteg, 2007).
What is common to these mechanisms is the assumption that the evaluation of the project
is private information of each community. My experimental setup starts from a different
2Some of the reported studies extend their analysis also to the opposite case, in which the project is
only beneficial to the host.
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perspective: the proposer of the project knows the type of the project (and the payoffs
generated). Communities, instead, know the different project’s types, but they are uncer-
tain about which type of project is proposed. My setup is motivated by the case studies
of Petts (1995) and Baxter et al. (1999), in which the community members fear that the
project will be noxious to them, while proposers try to argue that this will not be the
case.
Another stream of the theoretical literature studies the NIMBY problem in a frame-
work of political economy, and focuses on issues related to lobbying behavior by commu-
nities involved in the process of siting of the public project. Feinerman et al. (2004) study
a situation in which landowners of the possible host sites exert pressures on politicians.
The authors find that when the distribution of landownership is perfectly equitable and
all communities participate in the political arena, the government locates the facility at
the socially optimal site. Bellettini and Kempf (2013) include the size of the project in
their analysis, and find that the uniqueness of optimal site is not guaranteed. Moreover,
under lobbying behavior of households they find that inefficient provision of the public
good is possible. An important aspect that sets my experiment apart previous studies,
is the uniqueness of the host site. While the multiple possible host sites are possible in
many cases, there are also situations in which geographical constraints limit the possible
candidates to a single host site (e.g. Petts, 1995).
Besides the above mentioned experiments and a large number of case studies, the
empirical evidence on the opposition to public projects is rather small. To some extent,
my experiment shares some similarities with the questions of the surveys conducted by
Kunreuther and Easterling (1990) and Frey et al. (1996). In these face-to-face surveys,
individuals living in a perspective host community were offered with different hypothetical
monetary transfers, aimed at compensating them for hosting a project. These individuals
were hence asked whether they were willing or not to accept both the project and the
transfer. Both the studies find a negative correlation between the size of side-transfers
offered and the propensity to host the public project. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997)
show that this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that monetary side-transfers
crowd out the intrinsic motivation of the community members.
3 Experimental Design
In this experiment there are three treatments, that differ in the possibility to endogenously
disclose information about the project, or to offer compensatory side-transfers to the host.
All the other features of the design are identical across the treatments (Table 1).
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Table 1: Experimental Treatments.
Baseline Information Side-transfer
Information disclosure None Endogenous None
about the project’s type
Side-transfer to the host None None Possible
Matching protocol Random Random Random
within a cluster
Anonymity No subject IDs No subject IDs No subject IDs
Number of sessions 4 4 4
Number of matching 8 8 8
clusters
Show-up fee 2e 2e 2e
Number of periods 20 20 20
The Baseline Game. In the baseline treatment, I employ the game depicted in Figure
1. The game includes the Nature and three other actors: a Proposer (P ), a Host site
(H), and a Non-Host site (NH).3
The Nature endows P with one of three equally likely types of project: extracting
(e), NIMBY (n), or balanced (b) project. All projects can generate the same positive
social surplus, but they differ in how costs and benefits are shared among the actors. The
project’s type is private information of P , who must choose whether to renounce (Out) or
to offer it to H (In). If P chooses Out, the game ends in a status quo, where every actor
gets pi0. If P chooses In, H must decide whether to accept (a) or reject (r) to host the
project. If H chooses r, P suffers an opportunity cost obtaining pi < pi0, while H and NH
get pi0. If H chooses a, the actors’ payoffs depend on the type of the project realized.
4
The payoff from project k ∈ {e, n, b} to actor i ∈ {P,H,NH} is denoted by piki .
• Project e is beneficial to P , and is harmful for H and NH (pieP > pi0 > pieNH = pieH);
3In the field, several public and private agents concur to the siting a public project (e.g. central
government, government siting agencies, and private construction firms). These agents, who have the
common goal to successfully realize the project, are here grouped into a unique agent, i.e. the “proposer”.
The “host site”, instead, can be interpreted as single member of a community who votes for or against
hosting a public project in a referendum.
4In the field, there are cases in which the project is realized despite the opposition. This game best
resembles situations in which the endorsement of the host community (and of the local authorities) is
binding to realize the project (e.g. Petts, 1995).
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• Project n is beneficial to P and NH, and is harmful for H (pinP = pinNH > pi0 > pinH);
• Project b is beneficial to all three actors (pibP = pibNH = pibH > pi0).
For simplicity, I assume pinH = pi
e
H = pi
e
NH = pi. In the baseline treatment, NH takes no
action.
Figure 1: Baseline Game.
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Treatment with Information Disclosure. This treatment relies on the model of
collaborative communication of Dewatripont and Tirole (2005), “in which the sender’s
and receiver’s motivations endogenously determine the transfer of knowledge”. The model
captures two important obstacles to information disclosure: (1) the possibility of imperfect
alignment in actors’ interests in the project, and (2) moral hazard in teams.5
All actors can help H to learn the type of the project offered by P through a joint
effort. In particular, actors’ efforts determine the probability d, with which H learns the
project’s type (successful disclosure). With probability (1 − d), the disclosure fails, and
H does not learn the project’s type. Information disclosure is described by Equation 1:
d ≡ eP (eH + eNH) (1)
5Communication is often characterized by a private costs both for the sender, who must formulate a
clear message, and for the recipient, who must stay focused to absorb the content of the message. As a
consequence, when information disclosure fails, the sender can complain that the receiver did not listen
carefully, and the receiver can argue that the message was not clear.
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where eP , eH , and eNH are the efforts of P , H, and NH, respectively. Each actor can
either exert no effort or positive effort which costs c. Two further features are borrowed
from the model of Dewatripont and Tirole (2005). First, the successful disclosure is never
certain: if all actors exert their effort, H learns the project’s type with probability 0.90;
if only P and H (or NH) exert their effort, H learns the project’s type with probability
0.45; in all other cases, H does not learn the project’s type.6 Second, effort choices are
private information.
Equation 1 implies that P ’s effort is strategic complement to the efforts of H and
NH. It is reasonable to assume that the more “cooperative” is P , the more profitable
is for community members to listen, and the other way around. The tool also implies
strategic substitutability between H’s and NH’s efforts. Again seems plausible that the
more communities’ members participate to public meetings, the more likely is knowledge
to be transmitted. However, this can induce inhabitants to free-ride on others’ effort.
This game does not directly allow P to lie about his project’s type. However, P ’s
choice to propose a harmful project without exerting the effort can be seen as an attempt
to lie to H: since efforts are private information and there is always a positive probability
with which the disclosure fails, P can try to “hide” his responsibility for an unsuccessful
disclosure behind the chance.
Treatment with Side-transfers. If P chooses to invest, he can offer or not a compen-
satory transfer t to H facing a cost c(t).7 The transfer is only implemented if H accepts
the project. P can choose between two levels of transfers:
• Low transfer (t):partly compensates H for hosting a harmful project (pi + tl < pi0);
• High transfer (t): fully compensates H for hosting a harmful project (pi + tl ≥ pi0).
P endowed with project e or n can sustain the cost c(tl) without incurring in a loss
(pi − c(tl) > pi0). Only P with project e can sustain the cost c(th) without incurring in a
loss (pieP − c(th) > pi0). If P has project b, he always incurs in a loss if offers a positive
transfer (pibP − c(tl) < pi0). I also impose the deadway loss due to c(t) to be small enough
to make the projects’ realization less efficient than the status quo (
∑
i pi
k
i −c(t)+ t > 3pi0).
6The positive effort is equal to 0.63. The effort cost function postulated by Dewatripont and Tirole
(2005) is such that the cost of reaching d = 1 is equal to +∞.
7In the experiment, P cannot finance the side-transfer by “taxing” NH as it can happen in the field.
Since the interest is here mainly on the reaction of H to different levels of side-transfer, this simplification
does not undermine the relevance of the treatment.
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The Experimental Session. 18 subjects participated in each session. At the beginning
of the session, roles were randomly assigned: 6 subjects acted as P for the entire session;
the remaining 12 subjects played 10 round as H, and 10 round as NH in unpredictable
order.8 Subjects were randomly divided into two independent clusters. Within each
cluster, stranger matching protocol was used to match subject in groups of three across
the 20 periods of play. Each group included one P , one H, and one NH. At the end of
every period, P and H received feedback about their earning in that period, while the
NH was only informed about earnings in each period at the end of the session. At the
end of the session, one period was randomly drawn, and subjects were paid according to
their payoff in the drawn period, with a conversion rate of e0.30 for each token.
Procedures. I implemented four sessions for each treatment. I recruited 216 subjects
(72 for each treatment) from the database of the Bologna Laboratory for Social Sciences
(BLESS), who were invited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment was programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
4 Theoretical Predictions
Since H cannot observe the project of P , H’s beliefs about the project offered by P are
key to determine the equilibria of the games. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE): all actors’ strategies must be optimal given their beliefs, and beliefs
are derived from equilibrium strategies through Bayes’ rule whenever possible. I assume
that actors share a common prior about the project’s type equal to 1/3, and that they
are risk neutral. The derivations of the equilibria are in Appendix A.
4.1 Baseline Game
Proposition 1. Even though H finds it profitable to host the balanced project, in equilib-
rium no project is ever realized.
In the baseline, P is unable to credibly convince H that the offered project is balanced.
Indeed, if H would accept an unknown project, P would invest even when endowed with
harmful projects. The unique BNE of the baseline game is indeed that P never invests,
because he correctly anticipate that H would always reject.
8The order was the same across sessions. During a session, P , H, and NH were labeled A, B1 and
B2, respectively.
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The BNE is a PBE, if there exist a range of off-equilibrium belief which supports
it. Let qb be the off-equilibrium belief with which H expects the offered project to be
balanced, i.e. qb = Pr{b|In}. Then, H chooses to accept the project if and only if the
expected payoff from accepting is greater than the payoff from choosing to reject:
qbpibH + (1− qb)pi > pi0
qb > q∗ ≡ pi0 − pi
pibH − pi
(2)
So, for qb < q∗, the baseline game has a unique PBE, in which P never invests because
he correctly anticipates that H would always reject. For qb > q∗, no PBE exists.
4.2 Game with Information Disclosure
Proposition 2. Even if there is the possibility to disclose information about the project’s
type, no project should go through.
Conditional upon a joint effort by the actors, the information disclosure tool (Equation
1) enables P to credibly inform H about the type of his project. If the disclosure succeeds,
it is strictly dominant for H to accept only project b. By backward induction, it is strictly
dominant for P to renounce to harmful projects. It is also weakly dominant for H to exert
her effort only if she rejects whenever information disclosure fails.9 So, if P chooses to
invest, actors’ expected utilities are
UP = d
(
pibP
)
+ (1− d)(pi)− C(e)
UH = d
(
pibH
)
+ (1− d)(pi0)− C(e)
UNH = d
(
pibNH
)
+ (1− d)(pi0)− C(e)
The condition under which exerting the effort generates a higher payoff than the status
quo is d > C(e)
pibP−pi
for P , and d > C(e)
pib
H(NH)
−pi0 for H and NH. Given the parameters of
this experiment, both conditions can be satisfied if P and H or NH exert their effort.
However, since P is supposed to renounce to harmful projects, H finds it even more
profitable to always accept. This generates an incentive for P to propose also harmful
projects. Anticipating this, H prefers to always reject. As consequence, P never invests.
9This strategy is weakly dominant because when P chooses Out, H is indifferent between her off
equilibrium path strategies. However, its elimination does not affect the equilibrium outcome.
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The unique equilibrium of this game remains that P renounce to all types of project,
because he correctly anticipate that H would reject without exerting the effort.
4.3 Game with Side-transfer
Different assumptions on H’s preferences lead to different predictions. I focus on three
behavioral types. Self-regarding H is the standard benchmark. Civic H obtains an intrin-
sic benefit for behaving in a civic way (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). Social-welfare
concerned H has a taste for maximizing social surplus accounting for its distribution
(Charness and Rabin, 2002). Predictions are summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. .
• Self-regarding H: Only extracting projects are realized because only P endowed with
the extracting project can offer a fully compensatory transfer.
• Civic H: If the off-equilibrium belief about the offered project being balanced or
NIMBY are high enough, all types of project can go through and no transfer is ever
implemented, because transfers would crowd out H’s intrinsic motivation.
• Social-welfare concerned H: NIMBY and extracting projects go through, because in
both P can offer a partially compensatory transfer, which is enough to convince H
to host the project.
Self-regarding Host. As said, P can sustain the cost of positive transfers, t or t, only
if endowed with the project e or n. So, t and t signal to H that the project is harmful. H
never accepts if offered with t, because she infers that her final payoff would be of (pi+ tl)
which is lower than pi0 by definition. Instead, H always accepts the t (which is affordable
only by P with project e), since (pi + th) is higher than pi0 by definition. Although H is
aware that P with project b cannot afford a positive transfer without incurring in a loss,
H will reject if no transfer is offered: H anticipates that if she accepts a null transfer, P
endowed with a harmful project will mimic P endowed with project b.
The game has two BNE. In the first BNE, P never invests, because H always rejects.
This BNE is not a PBE, because for any off-equilibrium belief, H would accept if offered
with t. In the second BNE, P endowed with the extracting project invests and offers
the fully compensatory transfer; if endowed with the NIMBY or the Balanced project, P
renounces to it. This BNE is a PBE as long as H’s off-equilibrium belief is lower than q∗
(Condition 2).
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Civic Host. Even if this experiment may be hostile to intrinsic motivation, it is interest-
ing to establish on a theoretical basis what is the effect of transfers when H is intrinsically
motivated. I adapt to my setup the model of Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), who define
intrinsic motivations as related to “activities one simply undertakes because one likes to
do them or because the individual derives some satisfaction from doing his or her duty”.
H’s expected utility from accepting a project is given by the sum of her expected monetary
return and the expected intrinsic benefit for hosting the project:
UH(A|t) = Pr(b|t)(pibH + t) + (1− Pr(b|t))(pi + t)
+ Pr(e|t)i(e, t) + Pr(n|t)i(n, t) + Pr(b|t)i(b, t)
(3)
where D measures the intrinsic benefit from choosing to host the project, with D de-
creasing in t (Dt < 0). Consistent with the definition of intrinsic motivation of Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee, I assume H only obtains an intrinsic benefit if she either hosts projects
n or b; if she hosts project e, the intrinsic benefit is always null. For simplicity, I also as-
sume that, for a given transfer, hosting project b or n generates the same intrinsic benefit
(i(n|t) = i(b|t) > 0).10
Considering that only P with harmful projects can offer a positive transfer, it can be
shown that, if D does not decreases too slowly in t, H’s expected utility from accepting
an unknown project without a positive transfer is larger than the utility from accepting
the project and a partially compensating side-transfer (Appendix A.3.2). This result is
consistent with the crowding-out theory, and it implies that H should be more likely to
accept the project when t is equal to 0 rather then when t is equal to 6. By backward
induction, if H’s intrinsic motivation is strong enough, i.e. i(t = 0) ≥ 2.55, a self-
interested P always invests (irrespective to his project’s type), without offering any side-
transfer. If H’s intrinsic motivation is weak, i.e. i(t = 0) < 2.55, P endowed with the
extracting project always invests and transfers 12 tokens, as long as the i(Extracting, t =
12) is non-negative. P endowed with either the NIMBY or the balanced project always
opts for the status quo.
Social-Welfare Concerned Host. I model social-welfare concern following Charness
and Rabin (2002, Appendix 1). First, I define the disinterested social-welfare criterion as
10The model departs from the one of Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) in two main respects: (1) while
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee assume the project to be NIMBY, I allow for uncertainty on the project’s types;
(2) H chooses whether or not to accept the project, instead of choosing a level of endorsement.
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follows:
W (piP , piH , piNH) = δmin{piP , piH , piNH}+ (1− δ)[piP + piH + piNH ] (4)
where pi indicates a monetary payoff, and δ ∈ (0, 1) measures the concern for helping the
worst-off actor versus maximizing the total social surplus. H’s utility is then defined as
the weighted sum of her payoff and the social-welfare criterion:
VH(piP , piH , piNH) ≡ (1− λ)piH + λ [δmin{piP , piH , piNH}+ (1− δ)[piP + piH + piNH ]] (5)
with λ ∈ [0, 1] measuring how much H cares about pursuing the social-welfare versus her
own self-interest.11
Under a wide range of parameters δ and λ, H’s expected utility from accepting the
partially compensating transfer is larger than the expected utility derived from rejecting
(Figure 2). Allowing for social-welfare concern increases the number of BNE with respect
to the case in which H is selfish (Appendix A.3.3). However, the game only admits two
PBE. In the first PBE, for any off-equilibrium belief, H accepts the project if offered with
a partially compensating transfer (t = 6). By backward induction, P proposes both the
NIMBY and the extracting project, but always offers the partially compensating transfer;
P renounces to the balanced project. Under the same parameter restrictions, if H’s off-
equilibrium belief about the offered project being balanced is high enough, a second PBE
exists. In this equilibrium, P offers all the types of project without offering a transfer,
because H finds it optimal to always accept.
5 Results
I first present aggregate results (Results 1–3) and then I focus on the channels behind
those results (Results 4–5). The analysis exploits the data from the last 10 periods of
play, in which one can be more confident that subjects have understood the game.12
Result 1. Both information disclosure and side-transfers have a positive and significant
effect on the number of realized projects.
Out of 240 investment opportunities in each treatment, 51 projects were realized in
the baseline, 78 in the information treatment, and 104 in the side-transfer treatment.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the estimates from OLS regressions comparing the percentage
11The reciprocity component is omitted because I consider a one-shot game.
12The same results hold true over the 20 periods, but the evidence is more noisy.
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Figure 2: Social-Welfare Parameters and the Decision to Accept.
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Notes. The graph depicts the parameters’ space (δ×λ). In white is the region
where parameters are such that H prefers to accept both partially and fully
compensating side-transfers, rather than reject the project.
of projects realized in the baseline with percentage of projects realized in the information
treatment (column 1) and in the side-transfer treatment (column 2), respectively. The
treatment effect is measured by the variable Treatment dummy, which takes value 0 in
the baseline, and value 1 to indicate either the information treatment (column 1), or
the side-transfer treatment (column 2). Period dummies from 12 to 20 are included to
account for learning. Since period dummies’ coefficients are largely insignificant, I did not
report them. The estimated coefficients of Treatment dummy are positive and significant
at the 1% significance level, indicating that both tools foster the projects’ realization.
The regressions in panels B and C of Table 2 allow to understand whether the increase
in the number of realized projects is driven by more investments (panel B) and/or higher
acceptance (panel C). The positive and significant coefficients of Treatment dummy in
column 2 of panels B and C show that the possibility to transfer tokens to the host
increases both the number of offered and accepted projects. Instead, the information tool
has a significant effect only on the number of accepted projects (first columns of panels
B and C).
Relative to the information treatment, Result 1 does not confirm Proposition 2, which
predicts that no project should be carried out because the information disclosure tool is
not employed by the parties. The positive effect of side-transfers diverges from previous
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survey evidence (Kunreuther and Easterling, 1990; Frey et al., 1996). The evidence from
this treatment indeed appears more in line with the predictions of standard economic
theory, or with the hypothesis that hosts are concerned about increasing the social-welfare,
rather than with the hypothesis of motivational crowding-out. Still, the data do not allow
to disentangle whether subjects whether subject were not intrinsic motivated, or if their
intrinsic motivation was not strong enough to lead them to realize the project without
the side-transfer.13
13Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) argue that side-transfers only worse off the outcome of the interaction
only if individuals are intrinsic motivated. If individuals are not intrinsic motivated, the authors do not
exclude the possibility that side-transfers can be beneficial. This issue if further developed in Section 6.
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Table 2: Regressions on the Effect of Tools on the Projects’ Realization.
Baseline vs. Information Baseline vs. Side-transfer
(OLS) (OLS)
A. Dependent Variable: % of realized projects
Treatment dummy 11.2500∗∗∗ 22.0833∗∗∗
(3.3724) (3.6797)
Constant 19.3750∗∗∗ 20.2083∗∗∗
(5.9479) (6.1752)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 160 160
Number of clusters 16 16
R-squared 0.1158 0.2177
B. Dependent Variable: % of invest choices
Treatment dummy 5.8333 17.9167∗∗∗
(5.8337) (3.8861)
Constant 51.2500∗∗∗ 51.4583∗∗∗
(8.0100) (7.7210)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 160 160
Number of clusters 16 16
R-squared 0.0922 0.1605
C. Dependent Variable: % of accept choices
Treatment dummy 17.8151∗∗∗ 19.6490∗∗∗
(6.3926) (5.9373)
Constant 42.7208∗∗∗ 45.0761∗∗∗
(11.7542) (11.042)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 155 156
Number of clusters 16 16
R-squared 0.0891 0.1022
Notes. The dependent variable is the percentage of the projects realized / proposed / accepted within a matching
cluster, in each period. The variable Treatment dummy (0,1) measures the treatment effect when information
disclosure / side-transfer is possible or impossible. Dummies from period 12 to 20 are included to account for
learning. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One matching cluster in a period is one unit of observation. The
difference in the number of observation in panel C is due to the fact that there were periods in which no investment
was made within the matching cluster. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Result 2. Information disclosure and side-transfers significantly increase the social sur-
plus generated in the experiment.
Figure 3 suggests that the higher number of realized projects in the information and
the side-transfer treatments (Result 1) translated into higher generated social surplus.
Social surplus is defined as the total amount of tokens earned by all actors from the
projects’ realization.
Figure 3: Gross and Net Surplus across Treatments.
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Notes. The graph reports the average of matching groups’ gross (white) / net (black) surplus generated across the
last 10 periods of play. In the gross surplus, the deadway loss related to the use of the tools is neglected. In baseline,
gross and net surplus overlap, as no tool is available.
The positive effect of the introduction of both tools on the social surplus is statistically
significant at the 1% significance level according to the regressions in Table 3, where I
control for possible learning effects. Consistent with the theory, Result 2 holds true both
when considering the gross surplus (panel A) and the surplus net of the deadway loss
related to the use of the tools (panel B).
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Table 3: Regressions on Gross and Net Surplus Realized across Treatments.
Baseline vs. Information Baseline vs. Side-transfer
(OLS) (OLS)
A. Dependent Variable: Gross Surplus
Treatment dummy 35.4375∗∗∗ 69.5625∗∗∗
(10.6232) (11.5912)
Constant 61.0313∗∗∗ 63.6563∗∗∗
(18.7360) (19.4520)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 160 160
Number of clusters 16 16
R-squared 0.1158 0.2177
B. Dependent Variable: Net Surplus
Treatment dummy 31.8625∗∗∗ 55.4625∗∗∗
(10.4565) (11.1767)
Constant 60.6938∗∗∗ 67.7063∗∗∗
(18.4197) (19.6581)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 160 160
Number of clusters 16 16
R-squared 0.1058 0.1679
Notes. The dependent variable is the sum of the surplus generated through project’s realization within a matching
cluster in each period. The variable Treatment dummy (0,1) measures the treatment effect when information
disclosure / side-transfer is possible or impossible. Dummies from period 12 to 20 are included to account for
learning. Robust standard errors in parentheses. One matching cluster in a period is one unit of observation. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Result 3. Information disclosure and side-transfers have different impacts on the type of
projects realized and on how the surplus is shared across the actors.
Figure 4 illustrates the number and the composition of the realized projects, across
the three treatments. In the baseline, 45.1% of the 51 realized projects were extracting.
NIMBY and balanced projects represent the 25.5% and 29.4% of the realized projects,
respectively. In the information treatment, the percentages of extracting and NIMBY
projects decrease (19.2% and 11.5%, respectively), in favor of an increase in the percentage
of balanced projects (69.2%). The differences between the composition of the realized
projects in the baseline and in the information treatments are all statistically significant,
according to OLS regressions (Table 4, first column).
The composition of the projects realized in the treatment with side-transfers is al-
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most the opposite of the one information treatment: 55.8% of the realized projects were
extracting, while NIMBY and balanced projects were only the 25.0% and 19.2%, respec-
tively. Although the differences in the composition are not statistically significant (Table
4, second column).14 Although in a non-statistical way, the introduction of side-transfers
increased the share of extracting projects and decreased the share of balanced projects
with respect to the baseline. This evidence is hence quite consistent with the assumption
of self-regarding or social-surplus concerned hosts.
Figure 4: Realized Projects and Project’s Types across Treatments.
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Notes. The graph summarize both the number of projects realized in each treatment (outside the bars),
and the percentages of each project’s type (inside the bars).
14The differences in the shares of both balanced and extracting projects are close to be significant at
the 10% confidence level, with p−values of 0.108 and 0.106, respectively.
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Table 4: Regressions on the Realization of each Type of Project.
Baseline vs. Information Baseline vs. Side-transfer
(OLS) (OLS)
A. Dependent Variable: Share of extracting projects
Treatment dummy -0.2836∗∗∗ 0.1444
(0.0862) (0.0886)
Constant 0.3701∗∗∗ 0.4990∗∗∗
(0.1354) (0.1595)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 107 114
Number of clusters 16 16
R-squared 0.1428 0.0697
B. Dependent Variable: Share of NIMBY projects
Treatment dummy -0.1657∗∗ -0.2495
(0.0546) (0.078)
Constant 0.2494∗∗ 0.2412∗∗
(0.2403) (0.1118)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 107 114
Number of clusters 16 16
R-squared 0.0697 0.1138
C. Dependent Variable: Share of balanced projects
Treatment dummy 0.4493∗∗∗ -0.1225
(0.0841) (0.0756)
Constant 0.3804∗∗∗ 0.2598∗∗
(0.1411) (0.1148)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 107 114
Number of clusters 16 16
R-squared 0.2393 0.0758
Notes. The variable Treatment dummy (0,1) measures the treatment effect when information disclosure / side-
transfer is possible or impossible. Dummies from period 12 to 20 are included to account for learning. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. One matching cluster in a period is one unit of observation. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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The different compositions of the realized projects across the treatments reflect into
differences in the allocations of surplus among the actors (Figure 5). According to OLS re-
gressions (Table 5), both in the information and in the side-transfer treatments, the share
of the surplus obtained by proposers is significantly lower than in the baseline. However,
side-transfers have a weak effect, in terms of size and significance. The treatments have a
positive and strongly significant effect on the share of the surplus obtained by the hosts.
Finally, the surplus share of the non-host significantly increases with the introduction
of the information disclosure tool; their situation is unchanged when side-transfers are
introduced. While treatment effects on proposers’ and hosts’ shares are consistent with
standard economic theory, the effect on the non-hosts share in the side-transfer treatment
is counter intuitive. In the side-transfer treatment, only extracting projects should to go
through. Thus, one would expect a strong negative effect on the surplus share of the
non-hosts. Why is this effect not observed? The explanation behind the evidence relies
on the fact that, in the side-transfer treatment, the number of realized NIMBY projects
doubled with respect to the baseline (26 projects versus 13 projects). As is clarified by
Result 5, this unexpected increase in the number of NIMBY project is consistent with
the assumption of social-surplus concerned hosts.
Figure 5: Surplus Allocation across Treatments.
18.0%
26.8%
55.2%
26.7%
30.3%
43.0%
24.0%
26.9%
49.1%
Baseline Information Side-transfer
Host Non-Host Proposer
Note. The graph reports the percentage of the net surplus obtained by each actor in the last 10
periods of play, across the three treatments. Average net surplus was 669 tokens in the baseline, 988
tokens in the information treatment, and 1224 in the side-transfer treatments.
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Table 5: Regressions on the Surplus Allocation.
Baseline vs. Information Baseline vs. Side-transfer
(OLS) (OLS)
A. Dependent Variable: Share of the surplus to proposers
Treatment dummy -0.137∗∗∗ -0.0542∗
(0.0336) (0.0318)
Constant 0.5148∗∗∗ 0.5979∗∗∗
(0.0538) (0.0614)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 107 114
Number of clusters 16 16
R-squared 0.1807 0.1396
B. Dependent Variable: Share of the surplus to hosts
Treatment dummy 0.0956∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.0164)
Constant 0.2012∗∗∗ 0.1545∗∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0290)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 107 114
Number of clusters 16 16
R-squared 0.2324 0.1775
C. Dependent Variable: Share of the surplus to non-hosts
Treatment dummy 0.0414∗ -0.0068
(0.0228) (0.0246)
Constant 0.2840∗∗∗ 0.2476∗∗∗
(0.0349) (0.0437)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 107 114
Number of clusters 16 16
R-squared 0.0771 0.1061
Notes. The variable Treatment dummy (0,1) measures the treatment effect when information disclosure / side-
transfer is possible or impossible. Dummies from period 12 to 20 are included to account for learning. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. One matching cluster in a period is one unit of observation. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Result 4. Subjects exploit the information disclosure tool.
In the information treatment, there always exists a Pareto inferior equilibrium, in
which actors do not make use of the information disclosure tool (Section 4.2). However,
the experimental data show that subjects frequently exploit the possibility to disclose
information about the project’s type. Table 6 reports the average effort rate for all the
three actors in the information treatment. The average effort rate of each actor is strongly
different from 0. As expected, in 95.5% of the cases, proposers endowed with a balanced
project chose to exert a positive effort. This is not statistically different from 100% of
the cases according to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Z = −1.000, p-value = 0.3173).
The percentage of proposers’ positive efforts is not statistically different from 0 when
they are endowed with noxious projects according to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (Z =
1.414, p-value = 0.1575 for extracting; Z = 1.413, p-value = 0.1575 for NIMBY). The
Table 6: Effort Decisions of the Actors.
Proposer Host Non-Host
Average individual effort rate (%) 54.6 62.7 58.1
(21.6) (43.0) (40.7)
Average number of effort decisions per subject 6.2 3.1 3.1
(2.8) (1.2) (1.1)
Number of subjects 22 48 48
Notes. The average individual effort rate is computed by taking the average of effort decisions for each individual
and than computing the average effort rate for each actor. Standard errors in parentheses.
substitutability between the efforts of the host and the non-host should could lead to a
free-riding problem. The effort rates of host and non-host subject are statistically different
when controlling for repeated choices.
Result 5. Side-transfers are effective in increasing the number of projects realized, also
when they do not fully compensate the cost for hosting a noxious project.
The graph depicted in Figure 6 shows that host subjects offered with positive side-
transfers tend to accept the proje ct more often. In particular, the average acceptance
when offered a side-transfer of 12 tokens is not statistically different from 1 (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test: Z = −1.414, p-value = 0.1573). Subjects also tend to accept when they
receive a transfer of only 6 tokens, which does not fully compensate them for hosting
a noxious project. This results are consistent with the hypothesis that hosts are not
intrinsically motivated, but they are concern about maximizing the social surplus. Finally,
the acceptance rate is statistically different from 0 also when no side-transfer is offered
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(Wilcoxon signed-rank test: Z = 6.403, p-value = 0.0000). However, according to the
Logit regressions reported in Table 7 (column 1), the likelihood with which the host
accepts the project when offered with a null transfer is not statistically different from the
likelihood of accepting an unknown project in the baseline. This is not the case when
Figure 6: Effectiveness of Side-transfers.
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Notes. The graph reports the average of individual acceptance rates across the last 10 periods of play. Overall,
there were 93 transfers of 0 tokens, 51 transfers of 6 tokens, and 33 transfers of 12 tokens.
6 Final Remarks
This paper develops a novel experimental setup to provide new insights on the long
standing problem of communities opposition to the realization of public projects which can
be perceived as noxious (e.g. landfills, incinerators). Different from previous literature,
I stress that a key driver of the opposition is the mistrust of host community towards
the proposer of the project. Such mistrust emerges as a consequence of an informational
asymmetry about the type of the project. This study focuses on types of project which
produce the same social surplus, but differ in how the surplus is allocated among the
actors, leaving for future research cases in which projects also differ in the generated
surplus.
The paper also wants to shed light on how policy-makers can promote a fruitful par-
ticipation of local communities in the realization of public projects. To this purpose, two
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Table 7: Regressions on Accept Decisions under Alternative Transfers.
Dependent Variable: % of accept choices
t = 0 t = 6 t
(Logit) (Logit) (Logit)
Treatment dummy -0.137∗∗∗ -0.0542∗
(0.0336) (0.0318)
Constant 0.5148∗∗∗ 0.5979∗∗∗
(0.0538) (0.0614)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 107 114
Number of clusters 16 16
R-squared 0.1807 0.1396
Notes. The average individual effort rate is computed by taking the average
of effort decisions for each individual and than computing the average effort
rate for each actor. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
tools are studied. The fist tool is endogenous information disclosure about the project’s
type. According to the model of Dewatripont and Tirole (2005), information can be cred-
ibly disclosed only if both the sender and the receiver of the information exert a costly
effort in communication. However, the entry stage that characterize the game studied in
this experiment the tool not exploited in equilibrium. However, subjects tend to exploit
the tool in the experiment, leading to an increase in the number of realized projects. This
result emerges as the combined effect of a reduction in the number of noxious projects
realized and an increase in the realization of balanced projects. The unexpected use of
the tool may be rationalize by subjects’ concern for social surplus.
The second tool available to policy-makers tested in the experiment, is monetary
side-transfers to compensate the host community. Previous empirical studies have found
that monetary transfer offered inhabitants of perspective host site reduce their endorse-
ment towards the project (Kunreuther and Easterling, 1990; Frey et al., 1996). Frey
and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) explain this evidence through the theory of the motivational
crowding-out: the introduction of a monetary incentive crowds out the intrinsic benefit
that community members experience when they do their civic duty by hosting a socially
desirable project. In contrast, the present experiment outlines a significant increase in the
number realized projects due to the introduction of side-transfers. Indeed, subjects are
likely to accept to host a noxious project whenever they are at least partially compensated.
The evidence is hence more consistent with the hypothesis that subjects are concerned
about social surplus (Charness and Rabin, 2002). This different result can be explained
25
by a variety of aspects. First, the neutral framing used in the experiment is hostile to
intrinsic motivation, since subjects are induced to think in terms of payoffs. Moreover,
Kunreuther and Easterling (1990) and Frey et al. (1996) ran their surveys on a repre-
sentative sample of the population, while in my experiment subjects are mostly bachelor
and master students: besides differences in the age of the subjects, there might as well be
significant differences in their level of education. Risk aversion is another possible driver
of the difference in the results. In general, subjects are moderately risk averse in the lab
(e.g. Holt and Laury, 2005). In the field, where stakes are much higher, the assumption of
risk neutrality is improper (e.g. Hartley et al., 2014). Finally, I do not claim that the ev-
idence from my experiment rejects the hypothesis of motivational crowding-out. Rather,
it offers an empirical support to the conclusion of Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997, p.
753): when the public spirit is not prevailing, side-transfers can enhance the realization
of public projects. In the experiment this seems to be the case, since host subjects are
ready to harm non-host subjects by accepting extracting projects. The experiment shows
that, when the public spirit is weak, side-transfers can be particularly helpful, because
individuals still care about social-welfare. In other words, subjects are prone to accept
partially compensating side-transfers, renouncing to part of their payoff, to increase the
social surplus.
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Appendices
A Derivation of the Equilibria
The PBE of all games are found as it follows. By representing the game in normal form, I
first find all the profiles of strategies that are BNE. Next, for each BNE, I verify whether
there exists a system of beliefs such that together they constitute a PBE. I focus only on
pure strategies.
A.1 Baseline game
A strategy of P specifies for each project’s type (extracting, NIMBY, and balanced,
respectively) whether P renounces to the project (Out) or invests (In). H has only two
pure strategies: to accept (A) or reject (R) the unknown project. In the normal-form
game (Figure 7) are reported the expected payoffs of H, P , and NH, respectively.15 Best
responses are underlined.
Figure 7: Normal-form baseline game.
Proposer
OutOutOut OutOutIn OutInOut OutInIn InOutOut InOutIn InInOut InInIn
22 26.3 19 23.3 19 23.3 16 20.3
A 22 26.3 30 34.3 41 45.3 49 53.3
Host
22 26.3 30 34.3 19 23.3 27 31.3
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
R 22 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
In the baseline game, there exists a unique BNE, which is (OutOutOut,R). If H’s off-
equilibrium path belief about the offered project being balanced is qB < 9/22 (Equation
2), the BNE is a PBE.
A.2 Information treatment
A strategy of P specifies for each project’s type (extracting, NIMBY, and balanced,
respectively) whether P renounces to the project (Out), or invests exerting the effort
(Ine) or not (Inn). A strategy of H specifies whether H exerts her effort (e) or not (n),
and if accepts (A) or not (R) in the case of a successful disclosure for each project’s type
15NH’s expected payoff is reported for completeness, even though it does not affect the outcome of
the game when actors are characterized by self-regarding preferences.
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(extracting, NIMBY, and balanced, respectively), and in the case of a disclosure failure.
Finally, a strategy of NH specifies whether she exerts the effort (e) or not (n).
Figure 8 reports the game in strategic form after the elimination of dominated strate-
gies: in Matrix A. NH does not exert the effort; in Matrix B. NH exerts it. There exist
three BNE:
1. (OutOutOut,RRAnRn, n),
2. (OutOutOut,RRAnRn, e), and
3. (OutOutOut,RRAeRe, n).
BNE 1. is a PBE if H’s (and NH’s) off-equilibrium belief about the offered project being
balanced is so low that H (and NH) prefers to reject rather than exert her effort and
accept if the project is balanced even if every other actor exerts his/her effort. Formally,
d[qbpibH + (1− qb)pi0] + (1− d)pi0 − C(e) ≤ pi0
qb ≤ C(e)
d(pibH − pi0)
≡ q
When qb < q, BNE 2. is not a PBE, because playing e is a dominated strategy for NH.
If qb is high enough, no BNE is PBE because H would accept also if the disclosure fail.
So, H and NH do not have any incentive to exert their effort (i.e. H plays RRAnAn,
and NH plays n). Formally, this happens when the H’s expected payoff from accepting
without exerting the effort is higher than the expect payoff from exerting the effort and
rejecting when disclosure either fails or the project is not balanced:
d[qbpibH + (1− qb)pi0] + (1− d)pi0 − C(e) ≤ qbpibH + (1− qb)pi
qB ≥ 70
103
≡ q¯
BNE 3. is never a PBE because if H’s and NH’s off-equilibrium belief is q¯ > qB > q,
NH plays e, and H free-rides on NH’s effort by playing RRAnAn.
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A.3 Side-transfers treatment
A.3.1 Selfish Host
It can be shown that there exist two BNEs:
1. (OutOutOut,Rt0RtRth), and
2. (IntOutOut,Rt0RtAt).
where the subscripts denote the size of the side-transfer offered by P .
BNE 1. is not a PBE, because if H is offered t it is strictly dominant for her to play At
for any out of equilibrium belief. The BNE 2. is a PBE as long as H’s out of equilibrium
belief are below q∗ (Equation 2).
A.3.2 Civic Host
As Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), I restrict the analysis to the case in which the intrinsic
benefit from hosting either project n or b when no transfer (t0) is offered is large enough
to make H’s expected utility of accepting the project larger than the expected utility of
rejecting it. Formally,
1
3
pi +
1
3
(pi + i(t0)) +
1
3
(pibH + i(t0)) > pi0
i(t0) >
1
2
(3pi0 − 2pi − pibH) (6)
H’s expected utility of accepting an unknown project with t0 is larger than the expected
utility of accepting a project with a t if
1
3
(2pi + pibH + 2i(t0)) >
1
2
(2pi + 2tl + i(tl))
i(t0) >
1
2
(pi + 3tl − pibH) +
3
4
i(tl) (7)
Note that when Condition 6 holds, i(t0) > 1/2(pi + 3tl − pibH). So, Condition 7 is fulfilled
when D does not decrease too slowly in t. If Condition 7 holds, there exist six BNE:
1. (OutOutOut,Rt0RtRt),
2. (Int0Int0Int0 , At0RtRt),
3. (Int0Int0Int0 , At0AtRt),
4. (Int0Int0Int0 , At0RtAt).
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5. (Int0Int0Int0 , At0AtAt), and
6. (IntOutOut,Rt0RtAt).
BNE 1. to 3. are not PBE, because if H is offered t, it is strictly dominant for her to play
At for any out of equilibrium belief.
16 Similarly, also BNE 6. cannot be a PBE, because,
knowing that for the balanced P it is strictly dominated to offer t, it is always optimal for
H to choose Rt which delivers pi0, instead of choosing At, which delivers only 19. BNE 5.
is a PBE, if the out of equilibrium beliefs of H satisfy the following condition:
(1− qb − qn)pi + qnH(pi + i(t0)) + qbH(pibH + i(t0)) > pi0
qb >
pi0 − pi − qnHi(t0)
pibH − pi + i(t0)
A.3.3 Social-Surplus Concerned Host
Under the parameter restrictions depicted in Figure 2, there exist eight BNE:
1. (OutOutOut,R0RtRt),
2. (IntIntOut,R0AtRt),
3. (IntIntOut,R0AtRt),
4. (IntIntOut,R0AtAt),
5. (IntOutOut,R0RtAt),
6. (In0In0In0, A0RtRt),
7. (In0In0In0, A0AtRt), and
8. (In0In0In0, A0AtAt).
BNE 1. to 3., 6., and 7. are not PBE, because if H is offered t, it is strictly dominant for
her to play At for any off-equilibrium path belief. Similarly BNE 5. is not PBE, because
if a social-welfare concerned H is offered t, it is strictly dominant for her to play At for
any off-equilibrium path belief. BNE 4. is a PBE for any out of equilibrium belief. BNE
16This is true as long as accepting t does impose a psychological cost on H. For consistency with the
model of Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), I rule out this possibility.
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8. is a PBE if the H’s off-equilibrium path beliefs are such that the expected benefit by
accepting the unknown project are larger than the those of rejecting it. Formally,
qb
(
(1− λ)pibH + λ[δpibH + (1− δ)S]
)
+ (1− qb) ((1− λ)pi + λ[δpi + (1− δ)S])
> (1− λ)pi0 + λ[δpi + (1− δ)S]
where S and S are the social surplus when a project is accepted or rejected, respectively.
qb >
(1− λ)(pi0 − pi) + λ(1− δ)(S − S)
(pibH − pi)(1− λ+ λδ)
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1 Introduction
The vast majority of the scientific studies provides unequivocal evidence of a sharp rise
both of land and ocean surface temperature anomalies since 1850. An undisputed driver
of the global warming is the increased concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the
atmosphere. Human activity is responsible for most of GHG emissions, which reached
their highest peak in human history in 2010 (49 GtCO2eq/yr). Without adequate miti-
gation policies, the temperature increase in 2100 is expected to range from 3.7◦C to 4.8◦C
compared to pre-industrial levels.
It is difficult to assess all the possible impacts of global warming and estimate their
magnitude. However, scholars agree that its net economic effect will be negative for
the majority of the countries (Tol, 2009). Moreover, the climatic change may lead to
catastrophic events (e.g. the disappearance of entire ecosystems), which are difficult to
quantify in economic terms.
To prevent the occurrence of these negative scenarios, all countries should significantly
abate their GHG emissions so that gases concentration in the atmosphere can be slowly
disposed, or at least maintained under control. However, since every country will benefit
from the mitigation effort the other countries, there is room for opportunistic behaviors
which may undermine the international cooperation required to avoid the global warming.
These features make climate negotiations similar to a common-pool problem.
In this paper, we develop an experimental platform to study which are the specific
aspects of the “climate change game” that may hinder a cooperative reduction of the
emissions. In particular, we investigate whether the dynamic nature of this problem
makes it behaviorally difficult to cooperate. In every round of our infinite horizon game,
countries individually benefit from their own emission choice, but the sum of all countries’
emissions (i.e. global emissions) generates a damage which harms everyone. Across three
treatments, we vary the persistence of the damage due to the global emissions of certain
round. This is equivalent to say that we vary the rate at which the stock of global
emissions deteriorates. In the long persistence treatment, the whole global emissions
of one round survives to the next. In this scenario, past emissions choices will keep
damaging the countries in the future. In the no persistence treatment, instead, the stock
of emissions clears in every round. Finally, in the partial persistence treatment, we study
an intermediate scenario, in which half of the global emissions survives from one round to
the other. The relevant equilibrium concept is the Constant Action Markov equilibrium,
which prescribes that countries will choose their emission level without taking into account
the exernality that they will impose on every other country, thus every country will
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emit above the social optimum level. Cooperation among countries can be sustained as
an equilibrium outcome in all treatments. The damage coefficient is adjusted in every
treatment to ensure that the equilibrium predictions remain the same across treatments.
To add credibility to our setup, we distinguish between rich and poor countries. Rich
and poor countries have the same preferences over the per capita output they produce
through their own emissions. However, the same level of emissions generates a lower per
capita output in poor countries, because poor countries are generally characterized by a
larger population than rich countries.1 As a consequence, for the same level of output,
rich countries will obtain a lager benefit than poor countries. While standard economic
theory predicts that this form of heterogeneity should not affect the play, a large body of
experimental literature has shown that inequality can be an important driver of behavior.
In particular, there is experimental evidence that inequality can impede cooperation (e.g.
Tavoni et al., 2011; Anderson et al., 2008).
This study does not investigate which tools can help to enhance international cooper-
ation (e.g. communication, voting, or direct forms of punishments). We leave this issue
for future research.
2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to the growing literature that study climate negotiations through
the use of laboratory experiments. Milinski et al. (2008) are the first to modify a PGG
to capture the aspect of collective risk that characterize the climate change game. In
their experiment, subjects can invest their private endowment to prevent the climatic
catastrophe, i.e. the loss of the private savings of all the 6 subjects matched in a group.
At the end of the 10 rounds of play, if the money invested in environment protection by a
group is below a known threshold, the catastrophe takes place with a certain probability.
Experimental treatments differ in the likelihood of the catastrophe: 90% chances, 50%
chances, and 10% chances. Authors find that the catastrophe is likely to be avoided
when its likelihood is higher: with 90% chances, almost half of the groups mange to avoid
it. In the other two treatments, 80% up to the 100% of the groups failed in preventing
the catastrophe. This findings are consistent with the theoretical benchmark of rational
selfish subjects (Barrett, 2011).
Building on the design of Milinski et al. (2008), Tavoni et al. (2011) study whether
1Of curse many other dimensions of heterogeneity across countries characterize the context of interest.
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communication can help cooperation. Tavoni et al. argue that the big problem behind
this type of interaction is the multiplicity of equilibria. Communication in the form of
non-binding pledges on future investment decisions can help countries to coordinate on
cooperative equilibria. The authors also consider that countries are asymmetric, and
distinguish between poor and rich countries. Poor countries begin the game with an
endowment equivalent to 70% of the endowment of rich countries, because poor countries
are forced to invest to the environment protection in the first 3 rounds, while rich countries
(forcedly) invest 0. This type of inequality is different from the one of our experiment,
which is based on the fact that poor countries can achieve less per capita output through
their emissions, rather than on the idea of “historic responsibility” implemented by Tavoni
et al. (2011). The data show that, while inequality has a strong negative effect on the
ability to avoid the catastrophe, communication helps cooperation a lot also in the case
of asymmetric countries. Communication did not only improved coordination. It also
allowed rich countries to communicate to poor countries their willingness to invest more
than poor countries in environment protection, in order to balanced the effect of the first
three rounds played by the computer.
As noticed by Barrett (2011), Tavoni et al. (2011) try to add realism to the evidence
of Milinski et al. (2008). However, Barrett (2011) criticize the absence of scientific uncer-
tainty: subjects know the exact threshold they must reach to avoid the catastrophe. The
issue of climate negotiation under scientific uncertainty is tackled by Barrett and Dan-
nenberg (2012), who study how uncertainty of impacts and uncertainty on the threshold
affect the play in a modified PGG. The authors show both theoretically and experimen-
tally that the fear of crossing a dangerous threshold can turn climate negotiations into
a coordination game where cooperative outcome can be reached especially when commu-
nication among players is allowed (and this holds even if there is uncertainty about the
magnitude of the catastrophe). However, the uncertainty on the value of the dangerous
threshold turn the negotiation back into prisoner dilemma, where cooperation collapse.
The experiments presented above differ from ours because they focus on a catastrophic
risk which can be avoided if countries’ investments in environment protection are above a
certain threshold. In this regard, Barrett (2011) argues that it does not seem realistic that
all the efforts below or above the threshold are wasted. In reality, every additional ton of
emission can exacerbate the global warming. In our experiment, indeed, the damage is
gradually increasing in the stock of the emissions. Another important difference is that
all these studies are characterized by finite horizon.
There are however other experiments which investigate the emergence of coopera-
tive behaviors in games characterized by dynamic externalities. Though not all these
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experiments explicitly refer to the climate change problem, they are close to our study.
Previous experiments in this literature only consider the case of symmetric players. Thus,
the asymmetry among the players sets our study aside from the rest of this literature.
In a finite horizon common-pool resource game, Herr et al. (1997) analyze cooperation
when the current extraction of one subject increases the extraction costs of others in the
current period only (time-independent externalities), or both in the current period and in
future periods (time-dependent externalities). Cooperative outcomes are poor predictors
of behavior for both types of externalities. Moreover, lower payoffs are reported in the
time-dependent treatments, in part due to myopic behavior. An important difference
between this experiment and ours is the time horizon, since we study an infinite horizon
game.
Vespa (2013) studies cooperation in an infinite horizon stylized common-pool game
(Levhari and Mirman, 1980). Specifically, Vespa (2013) studies whether the reproduction
rate of the natural resource helps or not cooperation. He finds that most of the observed
behavior is consistent with Markov strategies. However, when the reproduction rate of
the resource is high, most diffused strategy tit-for-tat. As a consequence, it seems that
when the reproduction rate is low, cooperation is more fragile: subjects do not return to
cooperate upon any deviation. Moreover, if subjects cannot choose the maximal level of
extraction from the common resource, cooperation increases.
Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin (2013) develop a dynamic public bad experiment based on the
model of Dutta and Radner (2004), to explore how time horizon influence cooperation
between pairs of subjects. For the majority of the rounds, the authors do not detect
significant differences between the finite and infinite horizon games, with the exception
of the few last rounds in the finite treatment. However, within the finite horizon scenario
there is a positive effect of learning: subjects learn how to cooperate by reducing their
emissions. This effect is not registered in the infinite horizon scenario. Moreover, authors
find that when the experiment has an environmental framing subjects are less likely to
choose to pollute.
Another close paper to our experiment is the study on climate change by Sherstyuk
et al. (2014). The authors experimentally study an infinite horizon game characterized by
dynamic negative externalities (Dutta and Radner, 2004). Different from us, Sherstyuk
et al. (2014) mostly focus on understanding whether overlapping generations can reach
similar cooperation outcomes of a long-lived decision-maker. The authors also allow for
the use of non-strategic instruments which can enhance cooperation (advices to followers,
access to past history). The data show that socially optimal outcomes are often achieved
and sustained by long-lived players but not by overlapping generations. Under overlapping
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generations observed actions tend to become more myopic.2 The issue of intergenerational
decision-making in common-pool problems has also been studied by Chermak and Krause
(2002), and by Fischer et al. (2004). The first document scarce levels of intergenerational
cooperation in a finite horizon setting. The second find that subjects expects others to
care about future generations, but actions are not consistent with such an expectation.
3 The Model
We consider a set I consisting of four countries. Countries are of two types: two countries
are rich (r), and two countries are poor (p). So, I = {r, r, p, p}. In every round t, each
country i ∈ I chooses its level of GHG emissions ei(t) from an interval ranging from 0 to a
common upper-bound e, i.e. ei ∈ [0, e]. Countries use their emissions to produce output.
For the same level of emissions, p achieves a lower output per capita than r, because p’s
population is bigger. All countries benefit in the same way from their output per capita,
but they are equally damaged by the stock of pollution accumulated. These features are
captured by the following instantaneous payoff:
ui(ei, E) ≡ γLn(aiei)− (c× E)/4,
where γ > 0, E is the current stock of pollution and c/4 > 0 is the magnitude of the
damage related to it. The parameters ar and ap capture the differences in population
between r and p, so ap ≤ ar. The stock of pollution E accumulates according to the
following dynamic equation:
E(t) = σE(t− 1) +
∑
i∈I
ei(t),
where σ ∈ [0, 1] is the persistence rate of the emissions, and E(0) = E0 ≥ 0 is the initial
level of pollution.
Let us define ui(t) = u(ei(t), E(t)), where ei(t) is the action taken by country i at time
2Besides the research question and the symmetry among players, several other aspects differ between
the experiment of Sherstyuk et al. (2014) and our study. First, they consider a unique, low (equal to 0.3)
persistence rate of the stock of emissions. In our experiment we compare three possible persistence rates
(0, 0.5, and 1). Second, the game is played in groups of 3, while our groups consist of 4 subjects. Third,
the number continuation probability is much lower than the one we use (0.75 against 0.92). Fourth, they
consider a quadratic utility function while we employ a logarithmic utility function.
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t. The total payoff of country i is
vi =
∞∑
t=0
δtui(t)
where δ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor.
All countries observe all their individual actions ei(t) at any t. A strategy of a country
i is a mappings from H, the set of all possible histories, into actions.
Global Optimum. The global objective is an un-weighted sum of individual payoffs:
v = 2(vr + vp).
Proposition 1. The efficient actions are constant and, for any player, equal to
e∗ = γ
1− σδ
c
.
Proposition 1 simply states that the marginal benefit 1/ei is equal to the marginal
“over-time” (total) global cost 4× (c/4)/(1− δσ).
Constant-Actions Markov Perfect Equilibria. In these equilibria, strategies do not
depend on E0, neither on the equilibrium path nor out-of-equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Constant-MPE contemplate a constant action for any player in any
period equal to
eCMP = 4γ
1− σδ
c
Notice this is simply the marginal benefit γ/ei equal to marginal “over-time” (total)
cost
c
4
[
1 + δ
σ
(1− δσ)
]
=
c
4 (1− δσ)
Clearly, eCMP = 4e∗ and the difference
eCMP − e∗ = 3e∗
is decreasing in σ. For future reference, as shown in the proof, we can write the associated
value function as
V CMPi (E0) = U
CMP
i −
c
4(1− δσ)E0,
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where
UCMPi =
1
1− δ
[
γLn(ai e
CMP )− c
1− δσe
CMP
]
.
We now show the difference between the individual (present-valued) payoff with the
global optimum solution and the constant-MPE:
V ∗i (E0)− V CMPi (E0) =
γ
1− δ (3− Ln(4)) ≥ 0.
Finally, notice that when σ = 0 so that the game is in fact a repeated one, then eCMP
is equal to the Nash equilibrium action of the repeated game.
Trigger Strategies Equilibria. We focus on trigger strategies equilibria which rely on
the threat to revert to the constant-actions MPE eCMP discussed above. We name these
”Constant actions trigger equilibria”.
Result [To be proven] Constant actions trigger equilibria do exist.
Proposition 3. If δ ≥ δ¯ there exists a constant-actions trigger equilibrium (CT equilib-
rium) with a constant action eˆi = e
∗ = γ 1− δ
c
for any player i, where
δ¯ =
1
9
(8Ln(2)− 3) ' 0.28.
Notice that incentive compatibility is uniquely affected by δ: none of the other pa-
rameters affects incentive compatibility.
8
References
Anderson, L. R., J. M. Mellor, and J. Milyo (2008). Inequality and public good provision:
An experimental analysis. The Journal of Socio-Economics 37 (3), 1010–1028.
Barrett, S. (2011). Avoiding disastrous climate change is possible but not inevitable.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108 (29), 11733–11734.
Barrett, S. and A. Dannenberg (2012). Climate negotiations under scientific uncertainty.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (43), 17372–17376.
Chermak, J. M. and K. Krause (2002). Individual response, information, and intergen-
erational common pool problems. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment 43 (1), 47–70.
Dutta, P. K. and R. Radner (2004). Self-enforcing climate-change treaties. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 101 (14), 5174–5179.
Fischer, M.-E., B. Irlenbusch, and A. Sadrieh (2004). An intergenerational common pool
resource experiment. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 48 (2),
811–836.
Herr, A., R. Gardner, and J. M. Walker (1997). An experimental study of time-
independent and time-dependent externalities in the commons. Games and Economic
Behavior 19 (1), 77–96.
Levhari, D. and L. J. Mirman (1980). The great fish war: an example using a dynamic
cournot-nash solution. The Bell Journal of Economics , 322–334.
Milinski, M., R. D. Sommerfeld, H.-J. Krambeck, F. A. Reed, and J. Marotzke (2008).
The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate
change. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (7), 2291–2294.
Pevnitskaya, S. and D. Ryvkin (2013). Environmental context and termination uncer-
tainty in games with a dynamic public bad. Environment and Development Eco-
nomics 18 (01), 27–49.
Sherstyuk, K., N. Tarui, M.-L. V. Ravago, and T. Saijo (2014). Intergenerational games
with dynamic externalities and climate change experiments.
9
Tavoni, A., A. Dannenberg, G. Kallis, and A. Lo¨schel (2011). Inequality, communication,
and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences 108 (29), 11825–11829.
Tol, R. S. (2009). The economic effects of climate change. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives , 29–51.
Vespa, E. I. (2013). Cooperation in dynamic games: An experimental investigation.
10
Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. At any date t, let E be any initial value of emission and V (E)
the associated value function, i.e. the solution of the dynamic programming problem (the
Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation)
V (E) = Maxer,ep{2γ [Ln(arer) + Ln(apep)]−c×(σE + 2er + 2ep)]+δV (σE+2er+2ep)}.
Let ep(E), er(E) be solutions to the previous maximization. Plugging these into the
previous equation we obtain a functional equation in V (E) to be solved. We guess that
V (E) takes the following form:
V (E) = 2(wp + wr)− 2(kp + kr)E.
We now have to verify if these four parameters wi and kr exist that satisfy the HJB
equation and to identify them. From the HJB equation, applying our guess for the value
function we obtain
2(wp + wr)− 2(kp + kr)E = Maxer,ep{2γ [Ln(arer) + Ln(apep)]− c× (σE + 2er + 2ep) +
+δ[2(wp + wr)− 2(kp + kr)(σE + 2er + 2ep)]}.
The necessary conditions on er, ep are
γ
ei
= c+ 2δ(kp + kr)
or
e¯i =
γ
c+ 2δ(kp + kr)
which is independent of E. Plugging into the HJB Equation, we have
2(wp + wr)− 2(kp + kr)E = 2γ [Ln(are¯r) + Ln(ape¯p)]− c× (σE + 2e¯r + 2e¯p) +
+δ[2(wp + wr)− 2(kp + kr)(σE + 2e¯r + 2e¯p)]
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Solving for wp + wr
wp+wr =
1
1− δ
{
(kp + kr)E + γ [Ln(are¯r) + Ln(ape¯p)]− 1
2
c× (σE + 2e¯r + 2e¯p) + δ[−(kp + kr)(σE + 2e¯r + 2e¯p)]
}
in order for wp + wr to be independent of E it must be
kp + kr − 1
2
cσ − δ(kp + kr)σ = 0
that is
kp + kr =
1
2
cσ
1− σδ
which shows e¯i = e
∗. Finally, we also notice that
wp + wr =
1
1− δ
{
γ [Ln(are¯r) + Ln(ape¯p)]− 1
2
c× (2e¯r + 2e¯p) + δ[−1
2
cσ
1− σδ (2e¯r + 2e¯p)]
}
=
1
1− δ
[
γ [Ln(are¯r) + Ln(ape¯p)]− c
2 (1− σδ) (2e¯r + 2e¯p)
]
.
QED
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that if all players j 6= i play the constant action
eCMP then the best response for player i is ei = e
CMP which leads to a value function of
the type
V (E) = w − kσE.
(notice that the stock of pollution inherited from the past is σE). Indeed with this guess
on the value function we can write
w−kσE = Maxei{γLn(aiei)−
c
4
×(σE + ei + 3eCMP )+ δ [w − kσ(σE + ei + 3eCMP )]}.
The maximizer must satisfy
γ
ei
=
c
4
+ δσk ⇐⇒ ei = 4γ
c+ 4δσk
and, subsisting back, we have that it must be
−kσ = − c
4
σ − δkσ2
12
or, equivalently
k =
c
4 (1− δσ)
the previous HJB equation does not depend on E. It then follows that the best response
is indeed
ei =
4γ
c+ 4δσk
=
4γ
c+ 4δσ c
4(1−δσ)
= eCMP .
It is also useful to notice that with this result we can write
w =
1
1− δ
[
γLn(aie
CMP )− c
4 (1− δσ)4e
CMP
]
.
QED
Proof of Proposition 3. For any E, it can be shown that the incentive compatibility
constraint for any player i with a (candidate) CT equilibrium with actions eˆi is
γLn(ai eˆi)− c
4
× (σE + 2eˆr + 2eˆp) + δ
{
Uˆi − c
4(1− δσ)σ (σE + 2eˆr + 2eˆp)
}
≥ γLn(ai e˜i)− c
4
× (σE + e˜i + eˆi′ + 2eˆj) + δ
{
UCMPi −
c
4(1− δσ)σ (σE + e˜i + eˆi′ + 2eˆj)
}
Clearly, the optimal deviation e˜i requires
e˜i = e
CMP
and the constraint becomes
γLn(ai eˆi)− c
4
× eˆi + δ
{
Uˆi − c
4(1− δσ)σeˆi
}
≥ γLn(ai eCMP )− c
4
× eCMP + δ
{
UCMPi −
c
4(1− δσ)σe
CMP
}
Using the definition of
Uˆi =
1
1− δ
[
γLn(ai eˆi)− c
4(1− δσ)(2eˆr + 2eˆp)
]
and of
UCMPi =
1
1− δ
[
γLn(ai e
CMP )− c
1− δσe
CMP
]
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the constraint can be finally rewritten as (using eˆi = eˆr = eˆp)
1 + 3δ
4(1− δσ)c
(
eCMP − eˆi
) ≥ γLn(ai eCMP )− γLn(ai eˆi)
Now we consider in particular the efficient eˆi and the constraint finally becomes
γ
4
(3 + 9δ − 8Ln(2)) ≥ 0.
QED
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